Selections from Book I of Aristotle’s Politics on
Slaves and Women
(Jowett translation)
Part IV
Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can
live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with
necessaries. And as in the arts which have a definite sphere
the workers must have their own proper instruments for the
accomplishment of their work, so it is in the management of a
household. Now instruments are of various sorts; some are living, others
lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the
look-out man, a living instrument; for in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an instrument for
maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the family, a
slave is a living possession, and property a number of such
instruments; and the servant is himself an instrument which
takes precedence of all other instruments. For if every instrument
could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of
others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet, "of their own accord entered the
assembly of the Gods;" if, in like manner,
the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without
a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor
masters slaves. Here, however, another distinction must be drawn; the instruments commonly so called are instruments of production,
whilst a possession is an instrument of action. The shuttle,
for example, is not only of use; but something else is made by
it, whereas of a garment or of a bed there is only the use.
Further, as production and action are different in kind, and
both require instruments, the instruments which they employ must
likewise differ in kind. But life is action and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of action. Again, a possession
is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not only a
part of something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is
also true of a possession. The master is only the master of
the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not
only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence
we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by
nature not his own but another's man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to be another's man who, being a human being, is also a
possession. And a possession may be defined as an
instrument of action, separable from the possessor.
Part V
But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for
whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery
a violation of nature?
There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of
reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their
birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.
And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and that rule
is the better which is exercised over better subjects- for example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts; for the
work is better which is executed by better workmen, and where
one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a
work); for in all things which form a composite whole and which
are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a
distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to
fight. Such a duality exists in living creatures, but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of the universe; even in things
which have no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical
mode. But we are wandering from the subject. We will therefore
restrict ourselves to the living creature, which, in the first
place, consists of soul and body: and of these two, the one is
by nature the ruler, and the other the subject. But then we
must look for the intentions of nature in things which retain their
nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and
soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two;
although in bad or corrupted natures the body will often appear
to rule over the soul, because they are in an evil and
unnatural condition. At all events we may firstly observe in
living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intellect
rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. And
it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the
mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural
and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of
the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals
in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild,
and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature
superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the
other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all
mankind.
Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body,
or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is
to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors
that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can
be, and therefore is, another's and he who participates in
rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a
principle, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals
cannot even apprehend a principle; they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very
different; for both with their bodies
minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to distinguish
between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong
for servile labor, the other upright, and although useless for such
services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But the opposite often happens- that some have the souls and
others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men
differed from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as
much as the statues of the Gods do from men, all would
acknowledge that the inferior class should be slaves of the
superior. And if this is true of the body, how much more just
that a similar distinction should exist in the soul? but the beauty of the body is seen, whereas
the beauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear, then, that
some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter
slavery is both expedient and right.
Part VI
But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right
on their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and
slave are used in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by
law as well as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of
convention- the law by which whatever is taken in war is
supposed to belong to the victors. But this right many jurists impeach, as they would an orator who brought
forward an unconstitutional measure: they detest the notion
that, because one man has the power of doing violence and is
superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave and
subject. Even among philosophers there is a difference of
opinion. The origin of the dispute, and what makes the views invade each other's territory, is as follows: in some sense virtue, when
furnished with means, has actually the greatest power of
exercising force; and as superior power is only found where
there is superior excellence of some kind, power seems to imply
virtue, and the dispute to be simply one about justice (for it
is due to one party identifying justice with goodwill while the
other identifies it with the mere rule of the stronger). If these views are thus set out separately, the other views have no force or
plausibility against the view that the superior in virtue ought
to rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they think, simply
to a principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of
justice), assume that slavery in accordance with the custom of
war is justified by law, but at the same moment they deny this.
For what if the cause of the war be unjust? And again,
no one would ever say he is a slave who is unworthy to be a
slave. Were this the case, men of the
highest rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they
or their parents chance to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves, but confine the term
to barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they really mean
the natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it must be
admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. The
same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard themselves
as noble everywhere, and not only in their own country, but they
deem the barbarians noble only when at home, thereby implying that there
are two sorts of nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the other relative.
The Helen of Theodectes says: "Who would presume to call me
servant who am on both sides sprung from the stem of
the Gods?" What does this mean but that they
distinguish freedom and slavery, noble and humble birth, by the
two principles of good and evil? They think that as men and
animals beget men and animals, so from good men a good man springs. But this is what nature, though she may intend it, cannot always accomplish.
We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of opinion,
and that all are not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature, and also that there is in some cases a marked distinction between
the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one
to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one practicing
obedience, the others exercising the authority and lordship
which nature intended them to have. The abuse of this authority
is injurious to both; for the interests of part and whole, of
body and soul, are the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of his bodily frame. Hence, where the
relation of master and slave between them is natural they are
friends and have a common interest, but where it rests merely
on law and force the reverse is true.
Part XII
Of household management we have seen that there are three parts- one
is the rule of a master over slaves, which has been discussed already, another of a father, and the third of a husband. A husband and
father, we saw, rules over wife and children, both free, but
the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal,
over his wife a constitutional rule. For although there may be
exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter
for command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown
is superior to the younger and more immature. But in most constitutional
states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea
of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are
equal, and do not differ at all. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavor to create a difference of outward forms
and names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by
the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan. The relation of the
male to the female is of this kind, but there the inequality is
permanent. The rule of a father over his children is royal, for he rules by virtue both of love and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And
therefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus 'father of Gods
and men,' because he is the king of them all. For a king is the
natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same
kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder and
younger, of father and son.
Part XIII
Thus it is clear that household management attends more to men than
to the acquisition of inanimate things, and to human excellence more than to the excellence of property which we call wealth, and to
the virtue of freemen more than to the virtue of slaves. A
question may indeed be raised, whether there is any excellence
at all in a slave beyond and higher than merely instrumental
and ministerial qualities- whether he can have the virtues of
temperance, courage, justice, and the like; or whether slaves possess
only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty arises; for, if they have virtue, in
what will they differ from freemen? On the other hand, since
they are men and share in rational principle, it seems absurd
to say that they have no virtue. A similar question may be
raised about women and children, whether they too have virtues:
ought a woman to be temperate and brave and just, and is a
child to be called temperate, and intemperate, or note So
in general we may ask about the natural ruler, and the natural
subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For
if a noble nature is equally required in both, why should one
of them always rule, and the other always be ruled? Nor can we
say that this is a question of degree, for the difference between ruler
and subject is a difference of kind, which the difference of more and
less never is. Yet how strange is the supposition that the one ought, and that the other ought not, to have virtue! For if the ruler is
intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well? If the subject,
how can he obey well? If he be licentious and cowardly, he will
certainly not do his duty. It is evident, therefore, that both
of them must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural
subjects also vary among themselves. Here the very constitution of
the soul has shown us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and the other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we in maintain to be
different from that of the subject; the one being the virtue of
the rational, and the other of the irrational part. Now, it is
obvious that the same principle applies generally,
and therefore almost all things rule and are ruled according to
nature. But the kind of rule differs; the freeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the
female, or the man over the child; although the parts of the
soul are present in an of them, they are present in different
degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the
woman has, but it is without authority, and the child has, but
it is immature. So it must necessarily be supposed to be with
the moral virtues also; all should partake of them, but only in
such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment of his duty. Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in
perfection, for his function, taken absolutely, demands a
master artificer, and rational principle is such an artificer;
the subjects, on the other hand, require only that measure of
virtue which is proper to each of them. Clearly, then, moral
virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a
woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in
commanding, of a woman in obeying. And this holds of all other
virtues, as will be more clearly seen if we look at them in
detail, for those who say generally that virtue consists in a
good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like,
only deceive themselves. Far better than such definitions is
their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, enumerate
the virtues. All classes must be deemed to have their special
attributes; as the poet says of women, "Silence is a
woman's glory,” but this is not equally the glory of man.
The child is imperfect, and therefore obviously his virtue is
not relative to himself alone, but to the perfect man and to
his teacher, and in like manner the virtue of the slave is relative to a master. Now we determined that a slave is useful for the
wants of life, and therefore he will obviously require only so
much virtue as will prevent him from failing in his duty
through cowardice or lack of self-control. Some one will
ask whether, if what we are saying is true, virtue will not be
required also in the artisans, for they often fail in their work through the lack of self control? But is there
not a great difference in the two cases? For the slave shares
in his master's life; the artisan is less closely connected
with him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a
slave. The meaner sort of mechanic has a special and separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, not so the shoemaker or
other artisan. It is manifest, then, that the master ought to
be the source of such excellence in the slave, and not a mere
possessor of the art of mastership which trains the slave in
his duties. Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to converse with
slaves and say that we should employ command only, for slaves stand even more in need of admonition than children.