False Consciousness:
A Study of Some Methodological Problems of Critical Social Theories

Tom Atchison's Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1999

• Abstract
• Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

• Chapter 1 - Introduction
  • 1.1 "God created me to be a slave"
  • 1.2 Historical background 1: Ideology and false consciousness
  • 1.3 Historical background 2: Debates about pluralism and power
  • 1.4 Historical background 3: The idea of a critical social theory
  • 1.5 A look ahead
• Chapter 2 - False Consciousness as a Concept
  • 2.1 The general idea
  • 2.2 The schema
  • 2.3 Some examples
• Chapter 3 - Problems about Truth and Falsehood
  • 3.1 How can anything but beliefs be false?
  • 3.1.1 Wants and desires
  • 3.1.2 Needs
  • 3.1.3 Identities
  • 3.2 Who is in a position to distinguish the true from the false?
  • 3.2.1 Foucault's critique of the notion of ideology
  • 3.2.2 Feminist charges of arrogance and elitism
• Chapter 4 - Social Construction
  • 4.1 The idea of social construction
  • 4.1.1 Marx's theory of ideology
  • 4.1.2 Social construction outside the Marxian tradition
  • 4.2 Genesis and falsehood
  • 4.3 A note on critical theory and practice
• Chapter 5 - Challenges to the Importance of False Consciousness
  • 5.1 They are not wrong
• Chapter 6 - Real Interests
  • 6.1 Some preliminary observations
  • 6.1.1 Can we talk about false consciousness without imputing real interests?
  • 6.1.2 Marx and "interests"
  • 6.1.3 Ordinary language and ordinary judgements
  • 6.1.4 Four criticisms of 'real interests'
  • 6.2 Explanations of "interests"
  • 6.2.1 Revealed preferences
  • 6.2.2 Hedonism
  • 6.2.3 From actual to informed to rational preferences
  • 6.2.4 Objective lists and Aristotelian inquiries
  • 6.3 A pluralistic, contextual theory of value which still aims at objectivity
• Chapter 7 - Conclusion
• Bibliography

Abstract

This study attempts to provide clarification and qualified defense of the idea of false consciousness and of the related idea of a critical social theory.

I suggest that false consciousness typically involves four elements: It is false; it is produced by an oppressive social system; in turn, it supports or reinforces that system; and it conceals or misidentifies people's real interests. I argue that 1) contrary to Foucault, it is possible to identify a form of consciousness as false or ideological without presupposing any objectionable Enlightenment metaphysics; 2) contrary to a feminism which insists that 'every women's experience is valid', it is not necessarily arrogant or offensive to say that someone is mistaken; 3) contrary to an over-simple Humean picture of the mind, it is wrong to think of desires, wants, needs, etc., as unmotivated and uncriticizable; 4) some classically Marxist ways of understanding how 'social being determines consciousness' are obscure or implausible, but feminist and anti-racist writers have more subtle and interesting ideas on this subject, and the central proposition can be rescued; 5) contrary to the claim that there is a 'genetic fallacy' involved in criticizing beliefs on the basis of their origins, this can be proper when the wrong sort of origins make beliefs unlikely to be true; 6) although a number of recent writers have argued that subordinate groups are not falsely conscious and are instead kept in their places by force and co-optation, the evidence for this view is not conclusive, and in any case the view doesn't challenge the importance of the false consciousness of oppressors; 7) contrary to those who claim that any use of a concept of 'real' or 'objective interests' must be arbitrary or authoritarian, the notion can be explained in a suitably pluralistic and contextual way, but this does require an acknowledgement that dogmatic and over-simple identifications of class interests or the interests of women, for example, cannot be supported. Finally, I argue throughout that critical theories betray their emancipatory intentions if their methods are not participatory (as opposed to manipulative or even educative).

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Acknowledgments

Working on this project intermittently over many years, I have accumulated many debts, not least to those who made it materially and emotionally possible for me to get back to work. Top billing must go to my adviser, Doug Lewis, who stuck with me through many lean years, tried every trick in his well-stocked book until I finally started writing, then provided invaluable help with sorting out ideas, and still found time for meticulous copy-editing at the end. Sigurd Hoppe, Alan Braverman, and the rest of my brothers in the Thursday men's therapy group worked a kind of alchemy I hope someday to understand. Mary Hanf provided crucial massage therapy. My parents, Tom and Nancy Atchison, provided money, encouragement, and indispensable help with childcare. Corrinne Beddecarre, Susan Bernick, Lisa Disch, Dan Flory, Susan Heineman, Jeremy Iggers, Rhona Leibel, Doug Lewis, Liz Lewis, Mark Matthews, Garry Pech, Michael Root, Tamara Root, Ron Salzberger, Naomi Scheman, Peter Shea, and Mary Turck, friends, colleagues, teachers (overlapping sets), have been my intellectual community. Susan Heineman took over care of our children at several crucial junctures and thought with me late into many nights (to mention just the tip of the iceberg). Noah and Abram tolerated their father's preoccupation with as much good nature as any six and three year-olds should have to muster, and Noah, when I explained as best I could what I was trying to write about, contributed the following observations: everybody makes mistakes, and some people care too much about money. If you read no further, you have there the essential points.

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