Philosophy 303 - Principles of Inquiry: Ways of Knowing

Assignment #6

 

Topic: How should our approach to inquiry take human differences into account? (Differences, that is, like culture, class and gender.)  What sense can we make of the idea that there alternative ‘ways of knowing’ associated with these differences?  Is it possible that science (and the principles of inquiry modeled on science that are advocated in Schick and Vaughan's textbook) somehow reflect the viewpoint of some specific group (Europeans? males?)?

 

Part 1:

Read:

Nessa McHugh, “Women’s Stories” (A short piece that illustrates the kind of claim I have in mind,)

Patricia Hill Collins, "Toward an Afrocentric Feminist Epistemology" (A longer piece that illustrates very well the point of view we are considering: that there is more than one “knowledge validation process” and, thus, more than one epistemology, and that these are linked to group identity.  For Collins, it makes sense to be trying to develop an alternative epistemology, not (just?) because the standard epistemological principles are wrong, but because they are European and male.)

Wikipedia article on "Women's Ways of Knowing"  (As of July 16 this looks OK, but it is Wikipedia, so it can change.  I had  better source but it has disappeared from the Web.)

Elizabeth Anderson,"Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science"  (This is a long and somewhat technical article, but it does give a more precise and much more substantial answer to the question "how can there be a connection between gender and ways of knowing (or principles of inquiry)?" than anything else on this list.  Read the section called "Situated Knowers"   and the one called "Feminist Defenses of Value-Laden Inquiry." Next time we'll read a bit more (unless I change my mind).  Other sections of the article are optional.)

Optional:

Laura Miller, “Women’s Ways of Bullying”

Noretta Koertge on feminist critiques of science, Skeptical Inquirer, March-April 1995. 

(The pieces by Miller and Koertge illustrate the fact that some feminist women don’t much like this ‘ways of knowing’ talk either – may be it’s not just Eurocentric males!  Or maybe they are ‘male identified women’.  These readings are optional.)

 

Write: 

Try to explain as carefully and concretely as you can what is meant by the claim that there are different ways of knowing associated with different groups (men vs. women, Europeans vs. Africans).  Then, try to write a critical assessment of this claim.  Does it make sense to you?  Do you think it is true?  Would it be fair to say that the people who are advocating these ideas are failing to recognize the kinds of problems discussed in Chapter 5 of How to think About Weird things?  That is, are they failing to see that what they are advocating is simply a reliance on unreliable personal experiences?  Or is there a better way to understand what they are advocating? Would it be fair to say that they are exaggerating the importance of cultural differences and group identity?  Or not?  Write at least two (double-spaced) pages.


Part 2

Read:

Chapters 3 and 7 of Kitcher, Science, Truth, and Democracy (Yes, we already read Chapter 3, but read it again.)

Write:

In Chapter 3 Kitcher addresses the "underdetermination argument" that, according to Elizabeth Anderson, opens up the space for feminist values to play a legitimate role in science.  Kitcher rejects this argument.  But then in Chapter 7 he also rejects what he calls "The Myth of Purity"  -- the idea that scientific inquiry can be value-free.  So, according to Kitcher, scientific inquiry is objective, yet it is not value-free.  Explain Kitcher's position on the role of values in science.  (Why does he think the underdetermination argument fails?  Why does he think the myth of purity is a myth?  How do these two views fit together?) Explain as precisely as you can where exactly he disagrees with Anderson.  Whose view is better? Write at least a couple of (double-spaced) pages.