This very short piece includes a number of claims that challenge the sort of understanding of knowledge that has been developed in our textbook. Medical science is said to reflect a “technocratic, Western belief system” and “masculine patterns of thought.” The suggestion seems to be that women have a different ‘way of knowing’ that is more intuitive and that can be found when midwives get together to share stories. The problems our textbook points out with relying on personal experience and anecdotal evidence are not acknowledged here. Should we be worried that Schick and Vaughan are simply indoctrinating us into a culturally specific ‘way of knowing’ and that this may lead us to fail to appreciate the merits of other ‘ways of knowing’? This piece is too short to make any kind of case for this view. It is included here just to illustrate it.
2. Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism by Paul Boghossian
This book argues that the idea that there are alternative ‘ways of knowing’ that are equally valid cannot be sustained. Boghossian identifies a number of different claims that might be intended by the people who like to say this kind of thing, and he argues that none of them stand up to careful scrutiny. You will almost certainly need to read this short, dense book more than once.
3. How To Think About Weird Things, Chapter 8, “Relativism, Truth and Reality”
This chapter covers much the same ground as Boghossian’s book, at a much lower level of philosophical care and sophistication. It might, though, be helpful to read it first, as an introduction to these issues. Just keep in mind that the authors mush together claims and ideas that Boghossian carefully and rightfully distinguishes. I think the section on conceptual relativism (pp. 306-311) is especially likely to be helpful.
Answer all of the following questions:
What does Boghossian mean by each of the following? (Note: Boghossian is the kind of writer who is careful to define his terms. So, you should be able to find a passage in the text where he defines each of these. But don’t just quote that definition. Try to explain and illustrate in your own words what it means.)
Equal validity
The Classical Picture of Knowledge
Social Constructivism about Facts
Social Constructivism about Justification
Social Constructivism about Rational Explanation
Global Relativism about Facts
Epistemic Relativism
Notice that he does not accept the argument that this kind of constructivism (or relativism) is self-refuting, which is what Schick and Vaughan say (pp. 311-312). Why not?
He does however think that there is a better argument against ‘global relativism about facts’. What is that argument?
Do you think that Boghossian has succeeded in showing that this kind of relativism/constructivism is incoherent?
What is the “initially seductive argument” that can be given in defense of this doctrine? (the argument is described in Chapter 5)
Why does he think that this argument “fails to hold up under scrutiny”? (This point is made in Chapter 7.)
Why does he think that epistemic relativism is, in the end, incoherent? (last ten pages of Chapter 6?
What is the doctrine being criticized here and what does it have to do with the broader concerns of the book. (That is, why should we care whether or not our beliefs are caused by ‘epistemic reasons’ or by some other sorts of factors?)
At the end of Chapter 8 Boghossian says “We have examined three distinct arguments for the claim that we can never explain belief by appeal to our epistemic reasons alone; and we have found grounds for rejecting each and every one of them.” What are the three arguments and what are the reasons he gives for rejecting them?