Philosophy 303 - Principles of Inquiry: Ways of Knowing

 

Assignment #5

 

Topic: Assessing Kuhn’s challenge and the views of his critics: Relativism, Realism, Objectivity, and the Aims of Inquiry

 

 

The Famous Duck-Rabbit

 

Our goal for this unit is to try to arrive at a balanced assessment of Kuhn’s ideas.    Kuhn’s views have been enormously influential, but are they right?  And has some of their influence been based on misinterpretation of Kuhn?  In the process, we should be able to sharpen our understanding of the nature of scientific inquiry, of the attractions and dangers of relativism, and of the possibilities for objective knowledge.

 

 

Reading :

 

1.  How to Think About Weird Things, Chapter 8, "Relativism, Truth and Reality".

 

2.  T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Postscript (pp. 174-210); focus especially on sections 5 and 6 (pp. 198-207)

 

3.  Kitcher, Science, Truth, and Democracy, Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (pp.11-82)

 

 

Writing assignment:

 

Answer all of the following questions

 

1)      In Chapter 8 Schick and Vaughan consider three forms of relativism, which they label “subjectivism,” “social constructivism,” and “conceptual relativism.”  For each of these three views, try to state concisely:

a)      What does the view say?  (What is its central claim?)

b)      What reasons do S & V give to persuade us to reject it

c)      Are you persuaded?  Do you see any way to defend the view against their attack?

2)      In the Postscript to his book Kuhn tries to clarify his position and answer some of his critics.  Especially in sections 5 and 6 (pp. 198-207) he tries to answer charges that his position is relativist or that it makes science an irrational enterprise.  Based on what he says there, do you think it is unfair for Schick/Vaughn to label him a relativist?  (Explain.)  Do you think Kuhn succeeds in giving a coherent account of how scientists come to accept a new paradigm? (Explain.)

3)      Look again at the discussion of ‘criteria of adequacy’ in Chapter 6 of Weird Things (5th ed. pp. 179-190; 6th ed. pp.171-181).  Notice the passage (5th ed., p. 189; 6th ed.,  p.181) where the authors say, “there is no fixed formula for applying any of the criteria of adequacy.  We can’t quantify how well a hypothesis does with respect to any of them, nor can we definitively rank the criteria in order of importance. … Choosing between theories is not the purely logical process it is often made out to be.  Like judicial decision-making, it relies on factors of human judgment that resist formalization.”  After all is said and done, is this any different than Kuhn’s view?  (Explain.)

4)      Kitcher, like Schick and Vaughan, is trying to defend a view he calls “realism” (though he adds the qualifier “modest” to get “modest realism”).  And, like them, he is a critic of relativism (which appears in his text mainly under the label “constructivism”).  But his discussion of these issues is much more detailed and nuanced than theirs.  Also, his account includes some recognition of the inadequacy of traditional understandings of science – the views he attributed in Chapter One to “the scientific faithful.”  (Reread at least the last three paragraphs of Chapter One to remind yourself what his project is.)  By the end of this first section of the book he has not only defended the objectivity of scientific inquiry from relativistic (constructivist) criticisms. He has also explained why he thinks there is no such thing as ‘value-free’ inquiry – why, that is, “moral and social values [are] intrinsic to the practice of the sciences.”(p.65)  We need to understand both sides of his case. So:

a)      In Chapter Two, how does Kitcher use the example of Galileo and the telescope to argue that science can justify claims to know about the existence and nature of unobservable things?

b)      Also in Chapter Two, how does he use the example of a person using a subway system map to find her way around in London to show us that we have good reasons to think that we can get hold of “mind-independent truths”?

c)      In Chapter Three, Kuhn is invoked as the source of a claim that scientific revolutions are not resolved by evidence. (p.38)  Kitcher then argues that, in fact, they are (that is, that scientific controversies are settled by evidence).  How so?

d)     How does he argue in Chapter 4 that there are different ways of dividing nature into kinds and categories and that these are “relative to our capacities and our interests”?

e)      Like Schick and Vaughan, Kitcher makes use of an analogy between scientific theories and maps.  How in Chapter 5 does he use this analogy to suggest that scientific inquiry is the product of historically and culturally specific interests and that there is no “context-independent aim of inquiry”?

f)       Chapter 6 is long and difficult.  As best you can, explain what Kitcher thinks is the scientific significance of Dolly (the cloned sheep).  That is, why was Dolly an important or intersting scientific acheivement?  What does this illustrate about the context-dependence of ‘epistemic significance’?