From:
John Locke – Second Treatise of Government
Chapter IX - Of
the Ends of Political Society and Government.
Sec.
123. IF man in the state of nature
be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and
possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part
with his freedom? why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the
dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that
though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is
very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being
kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict
observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this
state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a
condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it
is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society
with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual
preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general
name, property.
Sec.
124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths,
and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property.
To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.
First,
There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common
consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide
all controversies between them: for though the law of nature be plain and
intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biased by their interest,
as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a
law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.
Sec.
125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent
judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established
law: for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of
nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to
carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as
negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's.
Sec.
126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and
support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution, They who by any
injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make
good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment
dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.
Sec.
127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature,
being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into
society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any
time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are therein exposed
to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of
punishing the transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the
established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their
property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power
of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it
amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by them
to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right and
rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the governments
and societies themselves.
Sec.
128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent
delights, a man has two powers.
The
first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and
others within the permission of the law of nature: by which law, common to them
all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society,
distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruption and
viciousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no
necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and
by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations.
The
other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish the crimes
committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he joins in a private,
if I may so call it, or particular politic society, and incorporates into any
common-wealth, separate from the rest of mankind.
Sec.
129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the preservation
of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made
by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of
that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine
the liberty he had by the law of nature.
Sec.
130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his
natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of
nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive
power of the society, as the law thereof shall require: for being now in a new
state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance,
and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its
whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in
providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall
require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of the
society do the like.
Sec. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any common-wealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.
Chapter XI - Of
the Extent of the Legislative Power.
Sec.
134. THE great end of men's
entering into society, being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and
safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established
in that society; the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is
the establishing of the legislative power; as the first and fundamental natural
law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the
society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in
it. This legislative is not only the supreme power of the common-wealth, but
sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it;
nor can any edict of any body else, in what form soever conceived, or by what
power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not its
sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed: for without
this the law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a
law, the consent of the society, over whom no body can have a power to make
laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received from them; and
therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one can be
obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by
those laws which it enacts: nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever,
or any domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the society from his
obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to
any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or farther than they do allow;
it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in
the society, which is not the supreme.
Sec.
135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be
always in being, or only by intervals, though it be the supreme power in every
common-wealth; yet,
First,
It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes
of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the society
given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no more
than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society,
and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another more power
than he has in himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over
himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or
property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the
arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary
power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the
law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of
mankind; this is all he cloth, or can give up to the common-wealth, and by it
to the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this.
Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the
society. It is a power, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore
can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the
subjects. The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only
in many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws known penalties annexed
to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as an
eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they
make for other men's actions, must, as well as their own and other men's
actions, be conformable to the law of nature, i.e. to the will of God, of which
that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation
of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid against it.
Sec.
136. Secondly, The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to its self
a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense
justice, and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and
known authorized judges: for the law of nature being unwritten, and so no where
to be found but in the minds of men, they who through passion or interest shall
miscite, or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there
is no established judge: and so it serves not, as it ought, to determine the
rights, and fence the properties of those that live under it, especially where
every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own
case: and he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own single
strength, hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries, or to punish
delinquents. To avoid these inconveniences, which disorder men's properties in
the state of nature, men unite into societies, that they may have the united
strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may
have standing rules to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To
this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society which
they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into such hands as
they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws,
or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty,
as it was in the state of nature.
Sec.
137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can
neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, which men
would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for, and tie themselves up
under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and fortunes, and by
stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet. It cannot
be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any
one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and
put a force into the magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will
arbitrarily upon them. This were to put themselves into a worse condition than
the state of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against
the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it,
whether invaded by a single man, or many in combination. Whereas by supposing
they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a
legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him, to make a prey of
them when he pleases; he being in a much worse condition, who is exposed to the
arbitrary power of one man, who has the command of 100,000, than he that is
exposed to the arbitrary power of 100,000 single men; no body being secure,
that his will, who has such a command, is better than that of other men, though
his force be 100,000 times stronger. And therefore, whatever form the
common-wealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and
received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions:
for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature,
if they shall have armed one, or a few men with the joint power of a multitude,
to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their
sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment unknown wills, without
having any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions: for all
the power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it
ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by
established and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their duty, and
be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within
their bounds, and not be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to
employ it to such purposes, and by such measures, as they would not have known,
and own not willingly.
Sec.
138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his
property without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the
end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily
supposes and requires, that the people should have property, without which they
must be supposed to lose that, by entering into society, which was the end for
which they entered into it; too gross an absurdity for any man to own. Men
therefore in society having property, they have such a right to the goods, which
by the law of the community are theirs, that no body hath a right to take their
substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent: without this
they have no property at all; for I have truly no property in that, which
another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent. Hence
it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or legislative power of any
commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject
arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be
feared in governments where the legislative consists, wholly or in part, in
assemblies which are variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of the
assembly, are subjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the
rest. But in governments, where the legislative is in one lasting assembly
always in being, or in one man, as in absolute monarchies, there is danger
still, that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the
rest of the community; and so will be apt to increase their own riches and
power, by taking what they think fit from the people: for a man's property is
not at all secure, tho' there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of
it between him and his fellow subjects, if he who commands those subjects have
power to take from any private man, what part he pleases of his property, and
use and dispose of it as he thinks good.
Sec.
139. But government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as I have before
shewed, entrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men might have
and secure their properties; the prince, or senate, however it may have power
to make laws, for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst
another, yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, or any
part of the subjects property, without their own consent: for this would be in
effect to leave them no property at all. And to let us see, that even absolute
power, where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute, but is still
limited by that reason, and confined to those ends, which required it in some
cases to be absolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of
martial discipline: for the preservation of the army, and in it of the whole
common-wealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior
officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or
unreasonable of them; but yet we see, that neither the sergeant, that could
command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach,
where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one
penny of his money; nor the general, that can condemn him to death for
deserting his post, or for not obeying the most desperate orders, can yet, with
all his absolute power of life and death, dispose of one farthing of that
soldier's estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command any
thing, and hang for the least disobedience; because such a blind obedience is
necessary to that end, for which the commander has his power, viz. the
preservation of the rest; but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do with
it.
Sec.
140. It is true, governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it
is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection, should pay out of his
estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his
own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves,
or their representatives chosen by them: for if any one shall claim a power to
lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority, and without such
consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property, and
subverts the end of government: for what property have I in that, which another
may by right take, when he pleases, to himself?
Sec.
141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any
other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have
it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of the
commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose
hands that shall be. And when the people have said, We will submit to rules,
and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, no body else can
say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any
laws, but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen, and authorized to
make laws for them. The power of the legislative, being derived from the people
by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that
positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make
legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of
making laws, and place it in other hands.
Sec.
142. These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by the society,
and the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of every
commonwealth, in all forms of government.
First,
They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in
particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at
court, and the country man at plough.
Secondly,
These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately, but the good
of the people.
Thirdly,
They must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the consent of
the people, given by themselves, or their deputies. And this properly concerns
only such governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least
where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to
be from time to time chosen by themselves.
Fourthly,
The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any
body else, or place it any where, but where the people have.
Chapter VII -
Of Political or Civil Society
(excerpts, footnotes omitted)
Sec.
90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted
the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society,
and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for the end of civil society,
being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of nature, which
necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own case, by setting up
a known authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any
injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the
society ought to obey; where-ever any persons are, who have not such an
authority to appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there
those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every absolute
prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion.
Sec.
93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of the world,
the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controversies,
and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects themselves, one
amongst another. This every one thinks necessary, and believes he deserves to
be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind, who should go about to take
it away. But whether this be from a true love of mankind and society, and such
a charity as we owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt: for this is
no more than what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may
and naturally must do, keep those animals from hurting, or destroying one
another, who labor and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage; and so are
taken care of, not out of any love the master has for them, but love of
himself, and the profit they bring him: for if it be asked, what security, what
fence is there, in such a state, against the violence and oppression of this
absolute ruler? the very question can scarce be borne. They are ready to tell
you, that it deserves death only to ask after safety. Betwixt subject and
subject, they will grant, there must be measures, laws and judges, for their
mutual peace and security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and
is above all such circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and
wrong, it is right when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or
injury, on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the
voice of faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of nature
entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the
restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state
of nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is to
think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may
be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to
be devoured by lions.