JOEL WHITEBOOK

4 The marriage of Marx and Freud: Critical Theory and psychoanalysis

The members of the Institute for Social Research were the first group of philosophers and social theorists to take psychoanalysis seriously – indeed, to grant Freud the stature that is generally reserved for the giants of the philosophical tradition. In addition to Hegel, Marx, and Weber, Freud became one of the foundation stones on which their interdisciplinary program for a critical theory of society was constructed. It has often been observed that the Critical Theorists turned to psychoanalysis to make up for a deficiency in Marxian theory, namely, its reduction of the psychological realm to socioeconomic factors. This explanation, however, does not go far enough. With a few notable exceptions, the Left was not particularly interested in the modernist cultural movements of the past century – or, worse yet, denounced them for their bourgeois decadence. Though it may have proved to be an impossible project, the Frankfurt School – largely under Adorno's influence – sought to integrate cultural modernism with left-wing politics. And this is one of the places where psychoanalysis came to play an important role. For, despite Freud's own stolid lifestyle and aesthetic conservatism, his creation, psychoanalysis, made an incontrovertible contribution to the radical avant-garde that was transforming almost every realm of European culture.[1] *The Interpretation of Dreams* and *Ulysses* are cut from the same cloth.

Although Freud's views on sexuality had a broader impact on the general public, his critique of philosophy – no less than Nietzsche's and Marx's – played a major role in the death of the ontotheological tradition and the rise of postmetaphysical thinking. After Freud's intervention into the history of western rationality, many of the major traditional *topoi* of philosophy – authority, morality,

subjectivity, political association, indeed reason itself – could no longer be approached in the same way. The feeling that they stood on the other side of this *kulturhistorisch* divide must have contributed to the *élan* one senses among the early members of the Frankfurt School.

The intimacy between the Frankfurt School and psychoanalysis was more than theoretical. The Institute for Social Research and the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute shared a building and held classes in the same rooms. Such eminent analysts as Anna Freud, Paul Federn, Hans Sachs, and Siegfried Bernfeld gave lectures to the general public, sponsored by the Critical Theorists. Max Horkheimer, the director of the Institute for Social Research, also sat on the board of the Psychoanalytic Institute. And Eric Fromm – a trained analyst and member of both institutes – helped the Critical Theorists educate themselves about the workings of psychoanalytic theory.[2] This contribution helped to prompt the Institute's groundbreaking studies on *Authority and the Family*.[3] The work was the first interdisciplinary empirical research that used psychoanalytic theory – in this case the theory of character – to investigate the relation between sociological developments and psychological phenomena.

After the war, the working relation between the Frankfurt School and psychoanalysis was reestablished when Horkheimer and Adorno returned to Germany. They gave their support to Alexander Mitscherlich's creation of the Sigmund Freud Institute, the institution in which psychoanalysis was rehabilitated in Germany after the debacle, which had left the country almost completely devoid of experienced analysts. Again, Horkheimer was on the board of directors of the psychoanalytic institute. And in the 1960s, Jürgen Habermas's discussions with Mitscherlich and Alfred Lorenzer, another prominent member of the Sigmund Freud Institute, played a major role in the philosopher's linguistic reinterpretation of psychoanalytic theory. Indeed, the influential Freud chapters in *Knowledge and Human Interests* were partly a product of those discussions.

HORKHEIMER AND ADORNO

There is nothing like a traumatic experience to shake up one's thinking. The shock of the First World War led Freud to radically

recast his model of the psychic apparatus, introduce his new instinct theory – which now included the death drive – and ultimately write his late cultural works. Similarly, the news of Walter Benjamin's suicide and the "realization that Hitler's barbarism had exceeded even the most melancholy prognoses of the twentieth century's most melancholic thinkers,"[4] compelled Horkheimer and Adorno to reexamine the basic assumptions of their project. To be sure, their thinking had always been idiosyncratic. But prior to the 1940s, however heterodox, their work had remained basically within the Marxian framework and, therefore, the Enlightenment tradition, insofar as it sought to provide rational accounts of the phenomena it investigated, explaining them in terms of the material conditions, broadly conceived, that gave rise to them.

But now the Enlightenment itself – rationality and the rational subject – appeared to be implicated in the catastrophe that was engulfing Europe. The validity of reason as an *organum* for understanding that experience could therefore no longer be taken for granted. A "nonrational" as opposed to an "irrational" theory of some sort, which could get behind rationality and the subject and examine their genesis, had to be created.[5] To forge this new species of theory and write the "prehistory" (*Urgeschicte*) of reason and the subject, which meant writing the "underground history" of Europe and chronicling "the fate of the human instincts and passions which are displaced and distorted by civilization" (*DE* 231), Horkheimer and Adorno turned to psychoanalysis. The radical nature of the new task led them to take up some of the most controversial and speculative aspects of Freud's works, namely his psychoanthropological theories of culture and civilization.

In the *magnum opus* of the classical Frankfurt School, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno presented their version of the psychoanalytic account of (individual and collective) development through a commentary on Odysseus's wanderings, taking Nietzsche and Freud's closely related theories of internalization[6] as their point of departure. Their central thesis is that the subject[7] comes into being through "the introversion of sacrifice" (*DE* 55). Sacrificial practices derive from a central principal of mythical thinking, namely, the law of equivalence, which for Horkheimer and Adorno represents the magical origin of rational exchange. Every piece of good fortune, every advance, which the gods bestow on

human beings, must be paid for with something of comparable value. Following this principle, early humankind attempted to influence the course of human and natural events by offering sacrifices to the gods in the hope that the deities would intervene on their behalf.

Odysseus sought to emancipate himself from the prerational and preindividuated world of myth and thereby escape the law of equivalence. His trials and adventures chronicle the stages in the emergence of the individuated, unified, and purposeful, which is to say, enlightened subject. Odysseus was already a transitional figure, somewhere between myth and enlightenment, for his incipient ego had developed to the point where he could make his basic calculation. He reckoned that by bringing the disorderliness of his internal nature under the control of a unified ego – that is, by repressing his unconscious-instinctual life – he could outwit the law of equivalence and survive the numerous dangers that awaited him on his journey home. These dangers represent the regressive pleasures of the archaic world – the forms of gratification offered by each stage of development – that threaten to divert the relatively immature ego from its developmental goals. The ego's main task, self-preservation, can only be achieved by staying the course. Moreover, every additional act of renunciation adds to the reality ego's consolidation and strength, further transforming it into a rational *qua* strategic subject who can manipulate the external world. And to the extent that external nature is reified, it is transformed into appropriate material for domination. Horkheimer and Adorno view Odysseus's legendary cunning, which is a "kind of thinking that is sufficiently hard to shatter myths" (*DE* 4), as the precursor of instrumental reason and the technical domination of nature.

There is, however, a flaw in Odysseus's strategy. And it becomes the "germ cell" (*DE* 54) out of which the dialectic of enlightenment unfolds. Although it is not directed outwardly, the renunciation of inner nature that "man celebrates on himself" (ibid.) is no less a sacrificial act than the ritual immolation of a bleating lamb. As sacrifice, it remains subject to the law of equivalence. A price must be paid for Odysseus's survival, that is, for victory over the dangers posed by external nature. That price is the reification of the self. Insofar as the ego distances itself from its archaic prehistory and unconscious-instinctual life, in one sense, it looses its mimetic relation to the

world. In another, perverted sense however, mimesis is preserved in the process, for an objectified self mimics the reified world it has objectified.

Because Horkheimer and Adorno assume that the process they delineated represents the only path to ego formation, they equate the autocratic ego with the ego as such. For them the integration of the self is inherently violent: "Men had to do fearful things to themselves before the self, the identical purposive, and virile nature of man was formed, and something of that recurs in every childhood" (*DE* 33).[8] What is more, the violence involved in the ego's genesis remains attached to it throughout all stages of its development. To preserve its unity, its identity, the ego must vigilantly maintain its boundaries on two fronts, against inner nature and outer nature alike.[9]

Enlightenment was supposed to emancipate humankind from fear and immaturity and promote its fulfillment through the development of reason and the mastery of nature. As conceived by Horkheimer and Adorno, however, the whole process of ego formation, and hence the project of enlightenment, is self-defeating. It systematically eliminates the possibility of achieving its own goal. Enlightened thinking reduces the ego's function to the biological activity of self-preservation – "mere life" in Aristotle's sense – and the sacrifice of inner nature makes a fulfilled life impossible. The liberation of "desire" may not in itself constitute freedom, as many Marcuseans and French *désirants* believed in the heady days following '68. (Given desire's darker sides, it would in fact result in barbarism.) But at the same time an intimate and unconstricted relation with unconscious-instinctual life is an essential ingredient of living well. It not only enhances the vitality and spontaneity of psychic life, but it enables one to invest the everyday experience with fantasy, thereby fostering a more mimetic relation to the world. "It is creative apperception more than anything," as D. W. Winnicott observes, "that makes the individual feel that life is worth living."[10]

The French psychoanalytic tradition, deeply influenced by Heidegger, especially his critique of the Cartesian subject, tends to view the ego in unequivocally negative terms, as an agent of self-deceiving rationalization and an opponent of desire.[11] Despite their hostility to Heidegger, Horkheimer and Adorno share many of these same criticisms of the ego, especially with respect to the question of

adaptation, but their position is more complicated. This is partly the result of political considerations. Fully aware of the price – the sacrifice of inner nature and the loss of a mimetic relation to nature – that was paid for the ego's emergence, they nonetheless believed that the formation of the modern subject also represented an undeniable advance. It marked the emancipation of the individual from its emersion in the quasinatural substance of premodern *Gemeinschaft* and the recognition of the new norm, autonomy, that, admittedly, has been only partially realized in modernity.

Whatever its deficiencies, the idea of the autonomous individual had to be defended on political grounds. For even if its "worldly eye" had been "schooled by the market," bourgeois individuality possesses a degree of "freedom from dogma, narrow-mindedness and prejudice," and thereby "constitutes a moment of critical thinking" (*MM* 72). And in the face of the hard totalitarianism of fascism and the soft totalitarianism of an administered world, Horkheimer and Adorno held that the "moment of critical thinking," of the capacity for independent political judgment, however limited, had to be preserved. They therefore reluctantly threw their lot in with the autonomous individual.[12]

On the basis of Horkheimer and Adorno's analysis, there is no way to break out of the dialectic of enlightenment from inside; only a utopian rupture of some sort could derail its seemingly relentless advance. And although Horkheimer and Adorno believed that a vision of redemption was necessary for illuminating the falseness of the world, they were opposed to the actual pursuit of utopian politics (*MM* 247).[13] As a result, they became imprisoned in a theoretical impasse from which they would never escape. Their political quietism – indeed, conservatism – that was partly the result of this impasse, only grew stronger over time. After the war, Horkheimer more or less moved away from psychoanalysis, but Adorno continued to pursue the psychoanalytic analysis the two had begun in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. In the spirit of negative dialectics, he used psychoanalysis for exclusively critical ends, and objected to any attempt at envisioning a nonreified conception of the self. Theoretically, his proposition that the whole is the untrue prohibited him from indulging in such positive speculations. Any effort to picture "a more human existence," he argued, could only amount to an attempt at a "false reconciliation within an unreconciled world." "[E]very

'image of man' is ideology except the negative one."[14] Moreover, for him, the ego psychologist's celebration of adaptation as the *ne plus ultra* of psychic health constituted a retreat from Freud's emphasis on conflict.[15] In fact, it amounted to a rationale for social conformism masquerading as developmental theory.

As Albrecht Wellmer observes, there was one place where Adorno disregarded his apprehensions about false reconciliation and prohibitions on utopian speculation: in his aesthetic theory. Adorno claimed that new forms of synthesis, consisting in a nonreified relation between particular and universal, part and whole, had already been achieved in exemplary works of advanced art, especially in Schoenberg's music and Beckett's theatre. He suggested, moreover, that the sort of *aesthetic* integration manifested in these works might prefigure a postreified mode of *social* synthesis, which could possibly be realized in a future society. But for some reason – perhaps a lingering Marxian prejudice against psychology – Adorno never allowed himself the same speculative liberty with respect to the synthesis of the self. That is, he never attempted to extrapolate possibilities for new, less repressive ("nonrepressive" is too utopian) forms of integrating the self from the "nonviolent togetherness of the manifold" he thought he perceived in advanced works of art.[16] But this idea of a different form of psychic integration could have provided a way out of the dialectic of enlightenment.

Within *Dialectic of Enlightenment* itself, there are in fact several points where Horkheimer and Adorno allude to a possible, quasi-utopian way out of its impasse. The most suggestive refers to a renewed "mindfullness [*Eingedenke*] of nature in the subject" (*DE* 40), which could serve as an antidote to the domination of internal nature and the reification of the subject. Unfortunately, the concept is not further elaborated by Horkheimer and Adorno. A reconsideration of the relation between the ego and the id might provide some content to this enticing idea.[17]

At this point, a critical examination of Horkheimer and Adorno's central assumption, namely, that the ego is autocratic as such, is called for. Not only will such a critique undercut one of the key premises of the dialectic of enlightenment, it will also generate some content for the notion of minding inner nature. Furthermore, it allows us to envision a "less repressive" mode of psychic integration without resorting to utopian speculation. Relatively recent

developments in theoretical and clinical psychoanalysis already offer considerable resources for adumbrating "*another relation* between the conscious and the unconscious, between lucidity and the function of the imaginary . . . another *attitude* of the subject between himself or herself."[18]

Considerable support for Horkheimer and Adorno's conception of the ego can be found in Freud. Freud's "official position," up to the 1920s at least, was that the ego's primary job was defensive and that the main function of the psychic apparatus was to reduce tension. The ego used repression, isolation, and projection to *exclude*, that is to say, "get rid of" excitation arising from inner nature.[19] The ego was considered strong and rational to the extent it maintained its solid boundaries and prevented the stimuli of instinctual-unconscious life from penetrating its domain. Freud's view of the ego, moreover, was tied up with his conviction that "scientific man," that is, the rational subject – the individual who has renounced magical thinking and been purified of the subjective distortions (*Entsellungen*) of fantasy and affect – represented "the most advanced form of human development."[20] Horkheimer and Adorno's acceptance of this mistaken position motivated their critique of the ego.

In a devastating observation, however, Hans Loewald notes that by adopting this view, psychoanalysis had "unwittingly taken over much of the obsessive neurotic's experience and conception of reality and . . . taken it for granted as 'objective reality.'"[21] The analysts had, in other words, equated a pathological mode of ego formation, namely, the obsessional, with the ego as such. And Horkheimer and Adorno's acceptance of this mistaken equation motivated their critique of the ego. But, as Loewald also notes, an ego that is "strong" in this sense is in fact only "strong in its defenses" – which means it is actually "weak."[22] On many topics, however, one can also find an implicit, "unofficial" position in Freud's thinking, and this is what Loewald does with respect to the ego. He extracts an alternative "inclusionary" conception of the ego from Freud's later structural theory. After 1924 the clinical experience and the immanent development of Freud's theory led him to a new problem. In addition to explaining defense – how things are gotten rid of – he found it necessary to elucidate how things are held together and preserved "in the realm of mind."[23] In direct opposition to the exclusionary model, the "optimal communication"[24] between the ego and the id was

now taken as a sign of health, and the isolation of the two agencies from each other a mark of pathology. A truly strong ego, which is to say, an inclusionary ego, can open itself to the "extra-territoriality" of inner nature and "channel and organize it" into "new synthetic organizations."[25]

Adorno no doubt would have had little patience with this line of exploration. Not only does it attempt to envisage a positive conception of the self in an "untrue" world, but it places considerable emphasis on the notion of integration. Because of its potential threat to "the nonidentical," Adorno was always suspicious of the process of unification. But he was also steeped in Hegelian philosophy and therefore must have been familiar with the distinction between differentiated and undifferentiated forms of unification. In fact, he applied the notion of a differentiated whole in his discussion of the new forms of synthesis manifested in exemplary works of art. And insofar as the ego is exclusionary, that is, unified through the compulsive exclusion and repression of the otherness within the subject that is unconscious-instinctual life, it is, in fact, an undifferentiated unity. As such, Adorno's objections are justified. But Loewald's point is that the exclusionary model represents a pathological form of ego formation. He argues that a truly strong ego's unity consists in a differentiated and differentiating whole that grows by integrating its internal Other, thereby creating richer, deeper, and more complex synthetic structures.

Had Adorno been willing to extrapolate from the modes of synthesis he saw in advanced works of art to new possibilities of psychic integration, he might have attained a degree of freedom from the dialectic of enlightenment. But, then again, viewed from the standpoint of redemption, such piecemeal advances in human development – which are all Freud ever offered – appear inconsequential.

MARCUSE

Marcuse accepted the diagnosis of the dialectic of enlightenment as Horkheimer and Adorno formulated it, but where they held their hand, he was willing to play the utopian card.[26] Marcuse had briefly participated in the German Revolution of 1918 and was more disposed towards activism than were his two senior colleagues. Moreover, the fact that he remained in the United States after the war

and became involved with the New Left – the authors of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* were always skeptical, indeed, even hostile towards the student movement – served to further Marcuse's activist proclivities. Indeed, Marcuse, who turned seventy in the fateful year of 1968, became something of an elder spokesman for the New Left. His deliberate and heavily accented pronouncements on the students' behalf seemed to confer some of the *gravitas* of the German philosophical tradition on their homespun radicalism. Marcuse's activism, however, was also tied up with a certain lack of theoretical restraint, which is one reason he could make the utopian move. In contrast to Adorno's exquisitely subtle dialectics, which could not have possibly resulted in a call to action, Marcuse often wrote in a declamatory style that is closer in spirit to the *Theses on Feuerbach* than to *Minima Moralia*.

The development of classical Critical Theory took place during the thirties and forties, the period that witnessed the Great Depression, the collapse of the Worker's Movement, and the rise of left-wing and right-wing totalitarianism. In spite of Horkheimer and Adorno's continued allusions to the radical transformation of society, these developments led them to become deeply suspicious of the Marxian project, which they began to see as itself only a variation within the Baconian project of domination. Marcuse, in contrast, wrote his two major works, *Eros and Civilization* and *One-Dimensional Man*, during the postwar boom years that followed, when "postindustrialist society" was in its ascendance; the capitalist economy was rapidly expanding, the labor movement seemed to have been integrated into the system, and a largely depoliticized consumer culture was colonizing the suburbs. It might be thought that these developments would also have led Marcuse to abandon Marxism. But this did not happen. Instead, he used neo-Marxian categories to explain the new historical constellation. And the tensions in his analysis – which, it could be argued, reflected tendencies within the object of his analysis – resulted from his neo-Marxian approach to the situation.

In *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse offered his version of the dialectic of enlightenment. However, rather than presenting it as a metahistorical narrative of the domination of nature and the triumph of instrumental rationality, he wrote a concrete socioeconomic analysis of the totally administered world, that is, the advanced capitalist society as it appeared to him in the 1950s. All significant "negative"

thinking and radical political practice, he argued, were effectively neutralized insofar as the system implanted "false" consumerist needs in its members and continued to satisfy them through the steady production of superfluous commodities. Only a cultural revolution that undermined these false needs or economic crisis – it was not clear which – could disrupt this arrangement. But because of the advances in technocratic management, such crises could be indefinitely averted. What elements of negativity that remained within the society were confined to bohemians and minorities, and their marginality rendered them politically insignificant.

In the New Left spirit of the times – and unlike the other members of the Frankfurt School, who remained conspicuously silent on the subject – Marcuse also pointed to the postwar struggles against imperialism as a possible external source of negativity that could disrupt the international economic system. It is more significant for our concerns that, in *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse, who later praised the revolt of the instincts, argued that sexuality did not represent a potential source of political opposition. On the contrary, it had been effectively harnessed to help propel economic growth. Through its exploitation by the advertising industry, the "repressive desublimation" (*O* 56) of sexuality provided a powerful tool for marketing relatively superfluous commodities.

But, at roughly the same time that he wrote his version of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, with its gloomy political prognosis, Marcuse also presented a philosophical thought experiment that could be used to support a program of utopian politics. Through an immanent critique of Freud, he sought to break the identification of civilization with repression and to prove that a "non-repressive" society was, at least in principle, possible (*EC* 35). He maintained that science and technology had developed to the point where they could, in principle, provide the material basis for a communist society. According to classical historical materialism, "the realm of freedom" could only be reached after the transition through socialism, during which the forces of production would be developed to their maximum (*FL* 62–82). Marcuse maintained, however, that this maturation had already taken place under capitalism. Rather than the conflict between labor and capital, the tension between unnecessary "surplus repression" (*EC* 35) and the potential for the radical reduction of repression – and "nausea as a way of life" – could provide

the motivation for political action in advanced capitalist society. That is, abundance rather than impoverishment would be at the heart of political action. Furthermore, where the anti-utopian Marx refused to speculate about the nature of a future "realm of freedom," Marcuse used psychoanalytic concepts to provide some content for this utopian concept (see *EC* 5). But whereas in *Eros and Civilization* Marcuse only entertained these arguments as a theoretical thought experiment, in the 1960s he came to believe that these developments had actually begun to unfold in the radical movements of the day (*L* 1).

Marcuse's strategy, one which became the prototype for many Freudian (and Lacanian) Leftists who followed him, was to *historicize* psychoanalysis in order to combat Freud's skepticism about the possibility of radical change. Freud had argued that "the program of the pleasure principle," governing the operation of the human psyche, is at "loggerheads" with the requirements of civilized social life.[27] He maintained, moreover, that this conflict – one of the major causes of human unhappiness – is not the result of contingent social arrangements that might be altered by political action. Rather, it is rooted in humanity's biological endowment – its sexual and aggressive drives – and constitutes an immutable transhistorical fact.

Against Freud's claim, Marcuse set out to demonstrate that the reality principle, which he took as the principle governing social life, is historically contingent and can assume different forms under different social conditions. He began by granting that *to date* a conflict between the reality principle and the pleasure principle has always existed. In almost all known societies, economic scarcity (*Lebensnot*) has forced humans to devote the greater part of their lives to the struggle for survival. This in turn has required them to repress their instinctual life and to forgo the pursuit of "integral satisfaction" (*EC* 11). In other words, the reality principle, as it has historically existed, coincides with what Marx called "the realm of necessity." But now, Marcuse maintained, the science and technology created by capitalism can produce a qualitatively new level of abundance that can provide the basis for the utopian leap required to break the dialectic of enlightenment.

Like most sexual liberationists who make use of psychoanalysis, Marcuse relied on early Freud and the concept of repression. For the early Freud, repression is initiated by the societal demand for

censorship of unconscious instinctual impulses. In one form or other, most sexual liberationists accept this picture and construe liberation as the emancipation of the unconscious-instinctual life – or desire – from the historically contingent requirements of social repression.

Freud observed that "with the introduction of the reality principle one species of thought activity was split off . . . kept free from reality-testing and remained subordinated to the pleasure principle alone. This activity is *phantasyzing*."[28] Marcuse took this to mean that phantasy, which "retains the tendencies of the psyche prior to its organization" (*EC* 142), is spared the influence of the reality principle and therefore represents an uncontaminated Other of the social order. Phantasy and the activities related to it, that is, mythology, sexual perversion and even artistic creation, can therefore supply a point of departure for utopian speculation (or phantasy) about "another reality principle" (*EC* 143) where instinctual life has been emancipated from historically superfluous repression. Because of their prelapsarian purity, phantasy and these phantasy-related ideas and activities foreshadow a form of life that could be created beyond the historical reality principle.

Like Horkheimer and Adorno, Marcuse believed that the unity of the self is intrinsically repressive. But in contrast to their ambivalent compromise, he was prepared to advocate the radical decentralization of the subject in the name of the "polymorphous perverseness" of inner nature. (In this, he anticipated the poststructuralist attempt to deconstruct the subject, which was based on similar assumptions about the necessarily violent nature of its unification.[29]) Although Horkheimer and Adorno did not directly refer to the relevant texts, especially "Mourning and Melancholia" and *The Ego and the Id*, they drew on Freud's later theories of internalization and the formation of the ego to argue for the repressive unity of the subject. But since Marcuse bases himself on early Freud, he primarily understands the integration of the self in terms of sexual development rather than ego formation. In 1905, Freud argued that the goal of libidinal development is to bring the partial drives under the dominance of genitality. The achievement of genitality was seen as the measure of psychosexual maturity and health.[30] Freud also used the same developmental theory to conceptualize sexual perversions, arguing that they represent the "inappropriate" continuation of pregenital sexuality into adult life. And no matter how much Freud and other analysts have

tried to remain scientifically neutral and refrain from conventional moral judgments, it follows from this theory that the perversions must be categorized as pathological.[31]

Marcuse criticized the subsumption of "polymorphous perversity" – that is, the generalized erotism of the child's body – under genital supremacy as a form of the violent unification of the subject. Following his general strategy, he attempted to historicize Freud's position. Again, the subordination of the stages of psychosexual development to genitality is not the manifestation of an inborn biological program, as Freud had argued. It results, rather, from the socioeconomic necessity of fabricating unified purposive individuals, who are manageable and can carry out their assigned tasks in the productive process. Economic imperatives necessitate "the temporal reduction of the libido." Unless one is outside the process of production – either an aristocrat or a lumpenproletariat – sexual activity must be restricted to a limited number of time slots each week. Likewise, the creation of manageable subjects also requires the "spatial reduction" of libido – that is, "the socially necessary desexualization of the body" and the concentration of sexuality in the genitals (*EC* 48).

Given these considerations, Marcuse maintains that sexual perversions only assume a pathological status – only appear as the *fleurs du mal* – within the normative framework of our repressive society. Viewed differently, they can be seen as expressing "a rebellion against the subjugation of sexuality" demanded by contingent society, indeed, against its very foundations. Like phantasy, with which they are closely related, perversions remain loyal to an era of development prior to the establishment of the reality principle. As such, they also contain a *promesse de bonheur*, an intimation of happiness that might be achieved under different conditions.

Of the three theories under consideration, Marcuse's has been the least successful at weathering the storms of time. *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Knowledge and Human Interests* are living texts that still speak to contemporary philosophers. *Eros and Civilization*, on the other hand, strikes one as a document from another era. Because of their disabused realism and theoretical integrity, the Frankfurt School believed that "the 'dark' writers of the bourgeoisie" (*PD* 106),[32] such as Weber and Freud, could not simply be dismissed as the products of the class that produced them. The daunting challenge

they posed to the progressive project had to be directly confronted. And this is what Marcuse attempted with his critique of Freud. When the influence of *Eros and Civilization* was at its height, Marcuse was seen as having accomplished a brilliant *coup de main*. If the dialectic of enlightenment, formulated with the help of Freud's pessimistic anthropology, requires a utopian solution, then Marcuse sought to provide it through an interpretation of Freud's own theories. He did not simply try to rebut Freud's arguments with rational counterarguments, as many perfectly respectable but less speculative critics have tried to do. Rather, using the Frankfurt School's favorite strategy, immanent critique, he tried to accomplish a dialectical reversal that transformed the profoundly anti-utopian psychoanalyst into a utopian thinker. Whatever its deficiencies, the boldness of Marcuse's approach deserves its due.

Today it is not only easy to spot the fallacies in Marcuse's reasoning, the whole stratagem appears mistaken. The central fallacy in Marcuse's "Freudo-Marxism" – or, perhaps more accurately, the "Marxification" of Freud – is the conflation of the idea of material scarcity with Freud's notion of *Ananke* (reality or necessity). There is no denying that, for Freud, the necessity of wrestling material survival from nature is an important reason for the harshness of life. The meaning of *Ananke*, however, is much broader in scope. Through inevitable loss, physical pain, and death, nature will always rise "up against us, majestic, cruel and inexorable" and remind us of our "helplessness and weakness, which we thought to escape through the work of civilization."[33] Whatever level of abundance might be achieved – and material well-being is nothing to scoff at – human beings will still be confronted with the "ineluctable,"[34] which will always administer an insult to our self-esteem.

One might dismiss these considerations as existential claptrap and argue that in a society that is not as atomized and anomic as ours the inevitable crises of life can be faced in a less anguishing way. And there is undoubtedly some truth to this assertion. Nevertheless, this overlooks some profound points not only of a philosophical but also of a *political* nature.

Psychoanalysis's objection to utopianism pertains not only to its idealizing assumptions about the goodness of human nature, it also considers utopianism to be undesirable in principle. The Freudian Left has often overlooked the fact that Freud was not only

concerned with the obstacles to human happiness that are created by the conflict between the drives and the demands of civilization. After he turned his attention to narcissism, he also became sensitive to the dangers that omnipotence posed for human existence. And these dangers have only become more manifest with time. In addition to the resolution of the Oedipus complex, the decentering of a child's omnipotence is a critical developmental task. (The two are, of course, closely related.) Children must learn to accept the existence of otherness and the finite nature of human life. A part of this process is assuming one's place in a law-governed society, populated by a plurality of other decentered individuals. This is an extremely painful developmental struggle, which we continue to fight all our lives. If there is one thing that psychoanalytic political theory on both the Left and the Right has taught us in the wake of modernity's failed utopias, it is the danger of omnipotence. It is now abundantly clear that a democratic society requires the renunciation of omnipotence (hubris) and the acceptance of self-limitation. Given these considerations, Marcuse's suggestion that primary narcissism "contains *ontological* implications," which point "to another mode of being" (*EC* 107, 109), and that Narcissus and Orpheus should become new cultural heroes is troubling. To be sure, given the ecology crisis, envisaging and cultivating less Promethian relationships towards the natural world is a matter of life or death. But the pursuit of "integral satisfaction" (*EC* 11) that disavows the incomplete and conflictual nature of human existence brings us into the register of omnipotence and therewith raises the specter of totalitarianism.

HABERMAS

Habermas came of age philosophically and politically in the years following the Second World War. Throughout his career, his concern – indeed, obsession – has been to prevent the madness that seized Germany from returning. For a young German of his generation, the aestheticized elitism and political quietism of Adorno did not represent a viable alternative. And, unlike Marcuse and the *enragé* students of the 1960s, Habermas was always wary of the revolutionary option. Instead, he pursued a path of radical reformism and tried to create the appropriate theory to justify it. He took the

prewar critique of scientized reason articulated by Weber, Heidegger, Adorno, and others as a point of departure for developing a more comprehensive theory of rationality. Over the years, as the promise of socialism faded into the background, Habermas's defense of rationality became increasingly bound up with his defense of democracy.[35]

Habermas did not have to struggle to escape from the dialectic of enlightenment, for he rejected the way it was formulated in the first place. He suggests that the trauma of their situation led "Horkheimer and Adorno to commence their critique of enlightenment at such *depth* that the project of enlightenment itself is endangered." But since "we no longer share" this desperate mood, he maintains we can return to a more reasonable depth, which is to say, more conventional level of theorizing (*PD* 106, 114). Horkheimer and Adorno's impasse, he argued, resulted from their theoretical monism, that is, their attempt to conceptualize historical development in terms of only one dimension, namely, instrumental rationality (*TCA* 1.4; *PD* ch. 5). To counter their monism – and this was his decisive innovation – Habermas introduced a second dimension, communicative rationality. Philosophically, adopting the distinction between instrumental and communicative rationality made it possible to clarify the theoretical and normative foundations of the Frankfurt project, something the first generation of Critical Theorists were not particularly interested in doing. And politically, rather than ending up with the immobilization that followed from the dialectic of enlightenment, the more nuanced dualistic analysis made it possible, Habermas believed, to elucidate the progressive as well as the regressive aspects of modernity. This in turn allowed him to identify the strategic points where effective political intervention is possible.

Despite the differences in the various versions of the theory over his long and productive career, Habermas has stuck to his basic intuitions about communication with remarkable tenacity. As early as his inaugural address at the University of Frankfurt, he made the assertion that "autonomy and responsibility are posited for us" by the very structure of language. "Our first sentence," he argued, "expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and constrained consensus" (*KHI* 314; see also *TP* 142–69). Though this claim may have gone further than prudence dictates, causing him to later soften it, some such intuition has always guided his work. To this day, Habermas argues that language is the only place

where normativity can be grounded after the demise of theology and metaphysics.

Despite the residue of Marcusean rhetoric in *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Habermas's interest in psychoanalysis was primarily methodological.[36] He believed it provided an actual instance of a successful critical science and could therefore serve as a model for Critical Theory. In line with his linguistic program, Habermas reinterpreted the critique of false consciousness – or the "hermeneutics of suspicion," as Ricoeur was christening it at roughly the same time[37] – as a theory of "systematically distorted communication."[38] This meant that as an actual critical science, psychoanalysis must also be a theory of systematically distorted communication. The false consciousness that psychoanalytic critique seeks to dispel – for example, the distorted manifest content of dreams, symptoms, and parapraxes – does not simply constitute a contingent mistake. It is rather the result of a process of obfuscation that interferes with an individual's attempt at self-understanding. Moreover, because of the systematic nature of the process, access to the true latent meaning underlying the manifest content is methodically blocked. The mere exertion of will, regardless of its intensity, is generally insufficient for overcoming the impasse. Something more than mere interpretation – technique – is required to remove the barriers.

But there is a problem lurking here and it proved to be of enormous import for the development of Habermas's theory. A theory of systematically distorted communication seems to require a concept of undistorted communication simply for those distortions to count as distortions. And the attempt to elucidate the nature of this normative underpinning in his theory, without falling into foundationalism, has plagued Habermas, one way or another, for the rest of his career.

Habermas had the right program, but when he moved away from psychoanalysis he gave up the means of fulfilling it. For unlike Adorno, he was willing to adumbrate a positive conception of the self. Indeed, using his communicative approach, he described a mode of self-organization that in general outline was strikingly close to Loewald's inclusionary model of psychic integration. The emergence of the ego, Habermas argued, takes place through the acquisition of language. It develops when children enter a linguistic community and internalize structures of ordinary language communication.

And as with Loewald (and late Freud), the goal of ego development is to maximize the ego's communicative openness towards unconscious-instinctual life in order to expand and enrich itself through the integration of its internal Other – its "internal foreign territory," as Freud called it.[39]

Habermas suggested that to understand psychoanalysis we should look to Freud's practice rather than to what he had to say about it. For when the founder of psychoanalysis tried to provide a methodological account of what he was doing, his "scientistic self-misunderstanding" (*KHI* 246) – that is, his attempt to explain his procedures in terms of energy, forces, displacement, discharge, and so on – caused him to misinterpret his own work. In a position that is close to Lacan's, Habermas maintained that the fault was not entirely Freud's. For the crude state of contemporary neurology and the primitive state of linguistic theory made it impossible for him to properly explicate what he was doing. Freud simply did not have access to the necessary theoretical resources, which only became available with the maturation of the theory of language in the middle of the twentieth century. To gain the proper perspective, Freud's scientific conceptualization had, in short, to be reformulated with the help of a theory of language.

That psychoanalysis ought to include the methods of linguistic analysis, however, does not mean it should be seen as a purely hermeneutical enterprise, as many of the "linguistic reformulators" have suggested.[40] At roughly the same time as *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Habermas had written an explicit critique of a purely hermeneutical, as well as a purely positivistic, approach in the social sciences (see *LSS* chs. 7–9), and now he applied this critique to an exclusively linguistic interpretation of psychoanalysis. He argued that, like the pure hermeneutics of the philologists, psychoanalysts aim at filling in gaps in understanding a text – in the case of analysis, the text of an individual's life history. (Whether a life history should be viewed as a text is another question.) But unlike philologists, psychoanalysts do not believe that the gaps they deal with are accidental. They are not the result of misfortune such as the destruction of an important papyrus, which may occur in the transmission of a classical text. The gaps in the texts of an individual's life history are products of specific defense mechanisms and the defensive operation that created them in the first place. When

the attempt is made to fill those gaps in the psychoanalytic process the defenses assume the functions of obstacles, that is, resistances. The obstructions to understanding, originating in the individual's development, in other words, have meaning, which itself must be understood.

Freud insisted that the cognitive apprehension of the inaccessible, repressed information is not by itself therapeutically sufficient. The resistances themselves must also be worked through in order to realign the dynamic forces that produced them. For Freud, this dynamic approach is the only way therapeutic change of any significance is possible. And Habermas, it must be stressed, underscores the necessity of the dynamic point of view and even cites the relevant *aperçu* from Freud. Bypassing the resistances and merely presenting patients with the relevant information about their unconscious lives, Freud observes, would "have as much influence on the symptoms of nervous illness as a distribution of menu-cards in a time of famine has upon hunger."[41] Habermas grants, moreover, that the existence of the defenses and resistances – and the necessity of exerting effort to work against them – require that we posit force-like, which is to say, dynamic, nature-like (*naturwüschig*) phenomena functioning in the human psyche. And in order to apprehend these phenomena theoretically, psychoanalysis must employ causal-explanatory concepts similar to those used in the natural sciences.

In the analytic critique of false consciousness, the analyst must therefore be "guided by theoretical propositions" (*KHI* 120), which can decipher the nature and sources of those systematic distortions in order to outmaneuver them. Even if we assume that the goal of psychoanalysis is ultimately hermeneutical – and this is debatable – objectified blockages to insight must be removed to achieve understanding. These considerations lead Habermas to soften his charge of scientism against Freud and to admit that the latter's scientific self-understanding was not "entirely unfounded" (*KHI* 214).[42] In line with his general position on the social sciences, Habermas argues that clinical experience demands that psychoanalysis unite *"linguistic analysis with the psychological investigation of causal connections"* (*KHI* 217). Ricoeur goes even further and argues that psychoanalysis gains its very *raison d'être* through a "mixed discourse" that combines the language of energy with the language of meaning.

What Habermas gives on the clinical level he takes back on the meta-psychological level. Whereas, like Ricoeur, he insists on the necessity of combining explanatory and hermeneutical discourses for elucidating clinical experience, he slips into a linguistic monism in his theoretical account of repression. Developmentally, repression sets in, Habermas argues, in danger situations – that is, in situations where children feel it is too risky to express certain wishes publicly. And by "publicly," Habermas means in the intersubjective grammar of ordinary language. (This is his way of reinterpreting secondary processes.) Given their weak egos and the superior power of parental figures, children have no choice but to bar these forbidden wishes from the public domain, including the internal public domain of consciousness, and express them in a distorted and privatized form. Privatization is accomplished by "degrammaticizing" the wishes, which is to say, by removing their expression from the grammar of ordinary language and banishing them to a prelinguistic realm, namely, the unconscious. (These "degrammaticzed" expressions are Habermas's way of interpreting the alogical thought of primary processes.) In this way children hide the "unacceptable" parts of themselves not only from others, but from themselves as well. The gaps that appear in an individual life history represent the points at which these repressions have disrupted the narrative.

Repression, then, is conceptualized as an entirely intralinguistic affair, consisting in the "excommunication" of forbidden ideas from the intersubjective realm of ordinary language. Habermas's attempted proof of this point borders on tautology: from the fact that repression can be undone in language (in the talking cure), he concludes that repression in practice is a linguistic process to begin with. But, as we saw Habermas acknowledge, the attempt to undo repression is not only a linguistic process, it encounters the force-like phenomena of resistances that must be combated with a powerful counterforce in clinical practice. The compulsion to think of everything in linguistic terms is so strong in Habermas, however, that he forgets his own observations, as well as his critique of Gadamer's linguistic monism.[43] This leads him to deny a crucial distinction in Freudian psychoanalysis: "The distinction between word-presentations and symbolic ideas," Habermas argues, "is problematic," and "the assumption of a non-linguistic substratum, in which

these ideas severed from language are 'carried out,' is unsatisfactory" (*KHI* 241). But the distinction between word-presentations and thing-presentations is a hallmark of Freud's entire construction. It was meant to mark the difference between conscious rational thought and a radically different form of "archaic mental functioning"[44] – that is, the essential division of the self. To deny that distinction not only softens the heterogeneity between the two realms, but also radically diminishes the foreignness of the ego's "inner foreign territory."

During his apprenticeship in Frankfurt, where Freud was a standard author on the Institute's syllabus, Habermas undertook a deep *Auseinadersetzung* with psychoanalysis. But to the degree that he began separating himself from the first generation of Critical Theorists – especially from Adorno – and developing his own position, he also disengaged from psychoanalysis. Ultimately, Adorno and Freud are Enlightenment figures, but, along the way, they certainly gave anti-Enlightenment claims their due. Indeed, the perpetual conflict between the two positions animates their thinking.[45] For Habermas, however, the threat of the anti-Enlightenment was so profound that he had difficulty letting its spokesmen make the strongest case for their positions. In his discussions of Nietzsche, Heidegger, or Derrida, one always knew the outcome from the start. Thus, while Habermas was at home with Freud the *Aufklärer* – the champion of rationality, autonomy, and critique of idolatry – he found Freud's pessimistic anthropology and stress on the irrational uncongenial.

Habermas's interpretation of psychoanalysis as a theory of systematically distorted communication planted the seeds for his ultimate departure from Freud. It contained one of the germ cells that spawned the theory of communicative action, and, as he pursued that theory, psychoanalysis not only became increasingly superfluous but also something of a nuisance. Furthermore, when the defense of "the project of modernity" emerged as the centerpiece of Habermas's program, the cognitive psychologies of Piaget and Kohlberg, with their progressive theories of development, suited his purposes better than Freud's. A shift in the nature of critique was, moreover, implicit in this development, from Marx and Freud to Kant – that is, from the practical critique of concrete human suffering to the philosophical critique of the conditions of the possibility of communication. The

hermeneutics of suspicion was quietly transmuted into the effort to justify the foundations of liberal democracy. With the Reagan–Thatcher counter-Reformation, the decline of the New Left, and the ambiguous rise of postmodernism, Habermas no longer trusted the vagaries of practical struggles as the medium of enlightenment. He now looked to "supra-subjective learning systems" to carry the "project of modernity."[46]

But Habermas made things too easy for himself. In principle, he advocates Reason's encounter with its Other as a way of undoing its reification – that is, of making itself richer, deeper, and more flexible. But the degree to which that process can succeed is proportional to the alterity of the Other to which Reason opens itself. Diminished Otherness results in the diminished potential for growth. With respect to the ego, the extension of the category of "the linguistic" to the unconscious lessens the foreignness of the ego's internal territory. This, in turn, reduces the split in the subject and the magnitude of the integrative task that confronts the ego. To the same degree, it also diminishes the ego's potential for growth. What Derrida said about the "dialogue with unreason" in Foucault, can also be said of the ego's encounter with its interior Other in Habermas. The whole process is "interior to *logos*";[47] *logos* never contacts its Other in any significant sense. It is telling that, though Habermas calls for the "linguistification" of inner nature, he does not suggest the "instinctualization" of the ego (*CES* 93).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

By the mid-1970s Critical Theory and psychoanalysis had gone their separate ways.[48] In defending the "project of modernity," Habermas and his circle became involved with the technical details of communication theory, the philosophy of law, and the foundations of liberalism in a more or less Rawlsian mode. To the extent that the communication theory of society required a psychology, Kohlberg's cognitive moral theory fitted the bill. Habermas believed that it lent credence to the strongly rationalist and progressivist direction of his thinking. Indeed, by the time Habermas's theory reached its mature form, it had become apparent that – despite his earlier interest in Freud – the pretheoretical intuitions guiding his project were, in fact, alien to the spirit of psychoanalytic depth-psychology. At the same

time, psychoanalysts were engrossed in important but highly circumscribed questions of technique, having to do with the treatment of narcissistic and borderline personalities. The tradition of psychoanalytic social theory – which had extended from Freud's *Totem and Taboo* through the last chapters of *Knowledge and Human Interests* – was all but abandoned.

Today, is there any way for Critical Theory and psychoanalysis to productively reconnect? The work of the old Frankfurt School was a response to the rise of fascism. "Late capitalist society" provided the socioeconomic backdrop for the next generation of Critical Theorists. Today, the most pressing and dangerous issue that confronts us is fundamentalism – East and West, Christian, Islamic, and Jewish. Because psychoanalysis and Critical Theory both grew out of Feuerbach and the Enlightenment, their understanding of religion left much to be desired. Now that faith in reason and progress has been dealt a series of serious blows and the secularization thesis (which in the 1950s and 1960s held that the spread of a scientific culture would progressively lead to the elimination of religion) has proven incorrect, a less biased examination of religion might provide a fruitful topic for probing "the limits of enlightenment" (*DE* 137). (This is not to say that the religious position has proven to be valid, but only that the questions it raises are too ubiquitous and profound to be ignored.) If Critical Theory is going to take the topic of fundamentalism up in any adequate way, it will once again have to call on psychoanalysis. As it was with fascism, the primitive rage and sheer irrationality of the phenomenon require the resources of psychoanalytic depth-psychology. Nothing else will do.

NOTES

1. See *An Unmastered Past: The Autobiographical Reflections of Leo Loewenthal*, ed. M. Jay (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 41. Peter Gay, referring to "the bourgeois as revolutionary," suggests that Freud required the safety and stability of his *bürgherlich* household in order to carry out his revolutionary and frightening exploration of inner reality. *Freud, Jews and Other Germans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 60–1.
2. Many of Fromm's papers from the 1930s are collected in *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Holt, Reinhart, Wilson, 1970). Limitation

of space will prevent me from examining Fromm's important debate with Marcuse, which appeared in *Dissent* in 1955 and 1956, and his eventual break with the Frankfurt School. For an account of this history, see Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950* (New York: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 86–106; Rolf Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance*, trans. M. Robertson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 265–73.

3. *Studien über Authorität und Familie: Forshungberichte aus dem Institute for Sozialforschung* (Paris, 1936).
4. Anson Rabinbach, "The Cunning of Unreason: Mimesis and the Construction of Anti-Semitism in Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*," in *In the Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals between Apocalypse and Enlightenment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 167.
5. Rabinbach, "Cunning of Unreason," p. 85. To avoid a common postmodernist error, it must be stressed that Horkheimer and Adorno were as hostile to irrationalism as they were to instrumental reasons. See Rush, chapter 1 above. Although they recognized that it involved them in a self-contradiction, the two Critical Theorists remained "wholly convinced . . . that social freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought" (*DE* xiii). See also Jay, *Dialectical Imagination*, ch. 8; Wiggershaus, *Frankfurt School*, pp. 302–49.
6. See Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. M. Clark and A. Swensen (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), pp. 56–57; Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. J. Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1975), xxi, ch. 7 (hereafter *SE*).
7. Although there are distinctions to be made between them, for the purposes of this chapter I will use the terms "subject," "self," and "ego" more or less interchangeably.
8. See also Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, trans. K. Blamey (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 300–1.
9. See *The Ego and the Id*, in *SE* xix, ch. 5.
10. D. W. Winnicott, "Creativity and its Origins," in *Playing and Reality* (New York: Tavistock, 1986), p. 65; see also Hans Loewald, "Psychoanalysis as an Art and the Fantasy Character of the Psychoanalytic Situation," in *Papers on Psychoanalysis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 352.
11. For the *locus classicus* of French poststructuralist psychoanalytic theory, see Jacques Lacan, *The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis (1954–1955)*, vol. II of *Seminars of Jacques Lacan*, trans. S. Tomaselli (New York: Norton, 1988).

12. In a counterintuitive move, Horkheimer and Adorno tied their defense of the autonomous subject to the most biologistic aspects of Freud's thinking. In fact, these two leftist philosophers criticized the progressivism of "neo-Freudian Revisionists," which sought to combat Freud's pessimistic anthropology by rejecting the importance of the drives and emphasizing the sociality of human beings. Against them, the Critical Theorists argued that their progressivism was too facile. Like much Whiggish leftism, it denied the moment of essential nonidentity between the individual and society – which is not only an antisocial phenomenon, but one that also safeguards individual freedom *vis-à-vis* the collective. Along with this, the progressives failed to adequately appreciate the danger of the integrative forces at work in modern society. Horkheimer and Adorno, in contrast, believed that the drives constituted an inassimilable biological core in the individual that could act as a barrier to those integrative forces.
13. See also Jay, *Dialectical Imagination*, pp. 3–40 and my *Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 75–89.
14. Theodor W. Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," trans. I. Wohlfatrth, *New Left Review* 47 (1968): 83, 86.
15. For the *locus classicus* see Heinz Hartmann, *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*, trans. D. Rapport, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association Monograph Series, no. 1 (New York: International Universities Press, 1964).
16. See Albrecht Wellmer, "Truth, Semblance and Reconciliation" and "The Dialectic of Modernity." Both essays can be found in his *The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and Postmodernism*, trans. D. Midgley (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). See also my *Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 152–63.
17. In the chapter on anti-Semitism, Horkheimer and Adorno make several other comments, which might also help to envisage a way out of the dialectic of enlightenment. They identify fascism, which constitutes the culmination of the dialectic of enlightenment, as "pathological projection" (*DE* 193). This diagnosis seems to imply the idea of "non-pathological projection." And in the same chapter they also refer to "false projection" (*DE* 188), which similarly appears to presuppose the notion of an idea of "true projection." The implicit notion of a "nonpathological" form of projection points to a potentially crucial,

yet unexplored, area of research in Critical Theory. Such research would necessarily lead to the examination of key passages in Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*. See Honneth, chapter 13 below.

18. Castoriadis, *Imaginary Institution of Society*, p. 104.
19. Hans Loewald, "On Motivation and Instinct Theory," in *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, p. 119. On the critique of exclusion from a different direction, see Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. R. Howard (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965), especially ch. 2.
20. Hans Loewald, "On the Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalysis," in *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, p. 228. See Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement Between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics*, in *SE* XIII, 88–90.
21. Hans Loewald, "The Problem of Defense and the Neurotic Interpretation of Reality," in *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, p. 30.
22. Loewald, "Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalysis," p. 241. See also Sigmund Freud, *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, in *SE* XX, 97.
23. *Civilization and its Discontents*, in *SE* XXI, 69. Clinically, Freud had discovered the importance of integration – the reabsorption of split-off ideas into the psyche's web of associations – during his work on hysteria. But, for complicated reasons that cannot be pursued here, several decades passed before he came to appreciate the importance of the ego's synthetic function. Its synthetic activity allows the ego to enlarge and integrate its unity by absorbing and integrating instinctual-unconscious material into its structure.
24. Loewald, "On Motivation and Instinct Theory," p. 108.
25. Loewald, *Sublimation: Inquiries into Theoretical Psychoanalysis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 5, 13.
26. See Jürgen Habermas, "Psychic Thermidor and the Rebirth of Rebellious Subjectivity," in *Habermas and Modernity*, ed. R. J. Bernstein (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 74ff.
27. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, in *SE* XXI, 76.
28. Freud, "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning," in *SE* XII, 222 (emphasis in original).
29. Peter Dews argues that in order to criticize one of the basic flaws underlying the poststructuralist project, "the assumption that identity can never be anything other than the suppression of difference must be challenged." *The Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory* (London and New York: Verso, 1987), p. 170.
30. See Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, in *SE* VII *passim*.

31. Despite Freud's struggle to remain scientific and value-neutral on the subject, the very concept of "perversion" seems to imply reference norm and therefore entail a normative judgment. See J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, trans. D. Nicholson-Smith (New York: Norton, 1973), pp. 306–7. This is not to say that, for Freud, pregenital sexuality did not have its acceptable place in the sexual life of the mature individual – namely, in foreplay. But if the indulgence of pregenital pleasures exceeds a certain duration in foreplay, or if the coupling does not culminate in genital intercourse, then the sex act crosses the line into perversion.
32. See also Max Horkheimer, "The Authoritarian State," in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, ed. A. Arato and E. Gebhardt (New York: Continuum, 1978), pp. 95–117.
33. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, in *SE* XXI, 16.
34. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay in Interpretation*, trans. D. Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 332.
35. See Baynes, chapter 8 below.
36. See Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), p. 195.
37. Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, pp. 32–5.
38. For a programmatic statement, see Jürgen Habermas, "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence," in *Recent Sociology, No. 2: Patterns of Human Communication*, ed. H. P. Dreizel (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 115–30.
39. Freud, "New Introductory Lectures to Psychoanalysis," in *SE* XXII, 57.
40. See Paul Ricoeur, "Image and Language in Psychoanalysis," in vol. III of *Psychoanalysis and Language, Psychoanalysis and the Humanities*, ed. J. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).
41. Freud, "'Wild' Psychoanalysis," in *SE* XI, 225.
42. At roughly the same time, and out of similar theoretical motives, Paul Ricoeur argued that because the psyche objectifies itself in order to hide from itself, Freud's "objectivism" and "naturalism" are well grounded. See Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, p. 434; "Technique and Nontechnique in Interpretation," in *The Conflict of Interpretations*, trans. D. Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 185.
43. In fact Habermas's position is, in the final analysis, virtually indistinguishable from Gadamer's. See my *Perversion and Utopia*, pp. 205–15.
44. Jonathan Lear, *Love and its Place in Nature* (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1990), p. 37.

45. See my "'Slow Magic': Psychoanalysis and the Disenchantment of the World," *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 50 (2003): 1197–218.
46. See Axel Honneth, *The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory*, trans. K. Baynes (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973), p. 284.
47. Jacques Derrida, "Cogito and the History of Madness," *Writing and Difference*, trans. A. Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 38.
48. The work of Axel Honneth represents an exception, inasmuch as it still tries to integrate the findings of psychoanalysis into a broader theory of society.

RAYMOND GEUSS

5 Dialectics and the revolutionary impulse

REVOLUTION

A story has it that during the storming of the Bastille in 1789, King Louis XVI, hearing the commotion, asked one of his courtiers what was going on, a riot (*émeute*) perhaps? "No, Sire," the courtier is said to have replied, "a revolution." One of several reasons for being suspicious of this story is that it seems to attribute to the courtier preternatural prescience. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe were to be the age of revolution, and this is at least as much a claim about intellectual history as it is about real political and social history. To be sure, the history of this period, from the Oath of the Tennis Court at the start of the first French Revolution to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, can be told as the story of a series of radical transformations of the political and socioeconomic structures of various European societies. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, were not just a period of actual instability and change, but one in which people acquired certain general ideas about the possibilities of large-scale social change and the human ability to unleash and perhaps control it. More or less spontaneous urban and rural violence, rebellions, *jacqueries*, uprisings of subjugated populations, conspiracies to seize established power, have been the stuff of much of human history for a long time, but events like this come to take on a new character altogether when the actual and potential participants (and the actual and potential opponents) acquire even a rudimentary general conceptual framework with which to understand their situation, the possible courses of action they could undertake, and the possible outcomes.