“Equality in a Multicultural Society”
Chapter 8 of Rethinking Multiculturalism by
Much of the traditional discussion of
equality suffers from a weakness derived from the mistaken theory of human
nature in which it is grounded. As we saw earlier, many philosophers understand
human beings in terms of a substantive theory of human nature and treat culture
as of no or only marginal importance. Broadly speaking they maintain that
human beings are characterized by two sets of features, some common to them all
such as that they are made in the image of God, have souls, are noumenal beings,
have common capacities and needs or a similar natural constitution; and others
varying from culture to culture and individual to individual. The former are
taken to constitute their humanity and are ontologically privileged. Human
beings are deemed to be equal because
of their shared features or similarity, and equality is taken to consist in
treating them in more or less the same way and giving them more or less the
same body of rights.
I have argued that this view of human
beings is deeply mistaken. Human beings are at once both natural and cultural
beings, sharing a common human identity but in a culturally mediated manner.
They are similar and different, their similarities and differences do not
passively coexist but interpenetrate, and neither is ontologically prior or
morally more important. We cannot ground equality in human uniformity because
the latter is inseparable from and ontologically no more important than human
differences. Grounding equality in uniformity also has unfortunate
consequences. It requires us to treat human beings equally in those respects in
which they are similar and not those in which they are different. While
granting them equality at the level of their shared human nature, we deny it at
the equally important cultural level. In our discussions of
the Greek. Christian and liberal philosophers we have seen that it is
also easy to move from uniformity to monism. Since human beings are supposed to
be basically the same, only a particular way of life is deemed to be worthy of
them, and those failing to live up to it either do not merit equality or do so
only after they are suitably civilized. The idea of equality thus becomes an
ideological device to mould humankind in a certain direction. A theory of
equality grounded in human uniformity is both philosophically incoherent and
morally problematic.
Human beings do share several
capacities and needs in common, but different cultures define and structure
these differently and develop new ones of their own. Since human beings are at
once both similar and different, they should be treated equally because of
both. Such a view, which grounds equality not in human uniformity but in the
interplay of uniformity and difference, builds difference into the very concept
of equality, breaks the traditional equation of equality with similarity, and
is immune to monist distortion. Once the basis of equality changes so does its
content. Equality involves equal freedom or opportunity to be different, and
treating human beings equally requires us to take into account both their
similarities and differences. When the latter are not relevant, equality
entails uniform or identical treatment: when they are, it requires differential
treatment. Equal rights do not mean identical rights, for individuals with
different cultural backgrounds and needs might require different rights to
enjoy equality in respect of whatever happens to be the content of their
rights. Equality involves not just rejection of irrelevant differences as is
commonly argued, but also full recognition of legitimate and relevant ones.
Equality is articulated at several
interrelated levels. At the most basic level it involves equality of respect
and rights, at a slightly higher level that of opportunity, self-esteem,
self-worth and so on, and at a yet higher level, equality of power, well-being
and the basic capacities required for human flourishing. Sensitivity to
differences is relevant at each of these levels. We can hardly be said to
respect a person if we treat with contempt or abstract away all that gives
meaning to his life and makes him the kind of person he is. Respect for a
person therefore involves locating him against his cultural background,
sympathetically entering into his world of thought, and interpreting his
conduct in terms of its system of meaning. A simple example illustrates the
point. It was recently discovered that Asian candidates for jobs in
Like the concept of equal respect,
that of equal opportunity, too, needs to be interpreted in a culturally
sensitive manner.
Equality before the law and equal protection of the law, too,
need to be defined in a culturally sensitive manner. Formally a law banning the
use of drugs treats all equally, but in fact it discriminates against those for
whom some drugs are religious or cultural requirements as is the case with
Peyote and Marijuana respectively for the American Indians and Rastafarians.
This does not mean that we might not ban their use, but rather that we need to
appreciate the unequal impact of the ban and should have strong additional
reasons for denying exemption to these two groups. The
Equal protection of the
law, too, may require different treatment. Given the horrible reality of the
Holocaust and the persistent streak of anti-semitism
in German cultural life, it makes good sense for that country to single out
physical attacks on Jews for harsher punishment or ban utterances denying the
Holocaust. In other societies, other groups such as blacks, Muslims and gypsies
might have long been demonized and subjected to hostility and hatred, and then
they too might need to be treated differently. Although the differential
treatment of these groups might seem to violate the principle of equality, in
fact it only equalizes them with the rest of their fellow-citizens.
In a culturally homogenous
society, individuals share broadly similar needs, norms, motivations, social
customs and patterns of behaviour. Equal rights here
mean more or less the same rights, and equal treatment involves more or less
identical treatment. The principle of equality ity
is therefore relatively easy to define and apply, and discriminatory deviations
from it can be identified without much disagreement This
is not the case in a Culturally diverse society. Broadly speaking equality
consists in equal treatment of those judged to be equal in relevant respects.
In a culturally diverse society citizens are likely to disagree on what
respects are relevant in a given context, what response is appropriate to
them, and what counts as their equal treatment. Furthermore, once we take
cultural differences into account, equal treatment would mean not identical but
differential treatment, raising the question as to how we can ensure that it is
really equal across cultures and does not serve as a cloak for discrimination
or privilege.
In this chapter I shall discuss the kinds of
difficulties raised by the principle of equality in a multicultural society.
Rather than discuss them in abstract theoretical terms or by means of
hypothetical examples which rarely capture their complexity, I shall analyse the real dilemmas multicultural societies have
faced and the ways in which they have sought to deal with them, and end by
briefly drawing out their important theoretical implications.
Equality of difference
In multicultural societies dress often
becomes a site of the most heated and intransigent struggles. As a condensed
and visible symbol of cultural identity it matters much to the individuals
involved, but also for that very reason it arouses all manner of conscious and
unconscious fears and resentments within wider society. It would not be too
rash to suggest that acceptance of the diversity of dress in a multicultural
society is a good indicator of whether or not the latter is at ease with
itself.
In 1972, British Parliament passed a law
empowering the Minister of Transport to require motor-cyclists to wear
crash-helmets. When the Minister did so, Sikhs campaigned against it. One of
them kept breaking the law and was fined twenty times between 1973 and 1976 for
refusing to wear a crash-helmet. Sikh spokesmen argued that the turban was just
as safe, and that if they could fight for the British in two world wars without
anyone considering their turbans unsafe, they could surely ride motor-cycles.
The law was amended in 1976 and exempted them from wearing crash-helmets.
Although this was not universally welcomed, Parliament was right to amend the
law. Its primary concern was to ensure that people did not die or suffer
serious injuries riding dangerous vehicles, and it hit upon the helmet meeting
certain standards as the best safety measure. Since the Sikh turban met these
standards, it was accepted as an adequate substitute for the helmet.'
This became evident in the subsequent
development of the law as it related to Sikhs. Although the Construction (Head
Protection) Regulation 1989 requires all those working on construction sites to
wear safety helmets, the Employment Act 1989 exempts turban-wearin-
Sikhs. The latter does so because it is persuaded by its own scientific tests
that the turban offers adequate though not exactly the same protection as the
helmet, and is thus an acceptable substitute for it. One important implication
of this argument is that if a turbaned Sikh were to be injured on a
construction site as a result of another person's negligence, he would be
entitled to claim damages for only such injuries as he would have suffered if
he had been wearing a safety helmet. The law does not allow anyone to work on a
construction site without an acceptable head-gear. However, it is willing to
compromise on the helmet if two conditions are satisfied. First, the
alternative head-gear should offer an equivalent or at least acceptable level
of protection. And second, those opting for it should themselves bear the
responsibility for such additional injury
as it may cause. The law lays down a minimally required level of protection and
uses it to regulate the permissible range of cultural diversity. So far as the
minimum requirement is concerned, it places the burden of injury on those
causing it. The burden of additional injury is borne by those who for cultural
reasons choose to meet the minimum requirement in their own different ways.
Such an arrangement respects differences without violating the principle of
equality, and accommodates individual choice without imposing unfair financial
and other burdens on the rest of their fellow-citizens.
In
Although the objection against the
turban smacks of cultural intolerance and treats Sikhs unequally, it is not
devoid of merit The RCMP is a powerful and much-cherished national institution
and, since
The diversity of headdress has raised
problems in other societies as well, especially in relation to the armed forces
and the police, the official symbols and guardians of national identity. Samcha Goldman. an orthodox Jew
serving in the secular capacity of a clinical psychologist in the United States
Air Force, was asked to resign when he insisted on wearing his yarmulke, which
the Air Force thought was against its standard dress requirement. When the
matter reached the Supreme Court, it upheld the decision of the Air Force by a
majority of one, arguing hat the 'essence of the military service is the
subordination of the desire and interests of the individual to the needs of the
service'. It is striking that the Court saw the yarmulke as a matter of
personal desire or preference rather than a religious requirement which Goldman
was not at liberty to disregard (Sandel, 1996, pp.
69f). Justifying the Court's decision, the Secretary of State argued that the
uniforms of the armed forces were the `cherished symbols of service, pride,
history and traditions', and that allowing variations in them was bound to
`operate to the detriment of order and discipline', foster `resentment and
divisiveness', `degrade unit cohesion', and reduce combat effectiveness. The
Supreme Court decision rightly outraged many members of Congress, which by a
sizeable majority passed a law permitting religious
apparel provided that it did not interfere with military duties and was 'neat
and conservative'.
There is much to be said for uniforms
in the armed forces. Since they are closely identified with the state and
symbolize its unity, their uniforms reinforce the consciousness of their
national role and create an appropriate corporate ethos. And it goes without
saying that they should be suitable for combat. However, this has to be
balanced against other equally important considerations. If the yarmulke,
turban and other religious apparels were to be disallowed, Jews, Sikhs and
others would be denied both an avenue of employment and an opportunity to serve
their country. Furthermore, the
The controversy concerning uniforms
occurs in civilian areas of life as well, where it raises issues that are at
once both similar and different. Since no question of national unity or
symbolism is involved, the controversy has no political significance. However,
it involves far more people, usually women, and has a great economic
significance.
Many Asian women's refusal to wear
uniforms in hospitals, stores and schools has led to much litigation and
contradictory judgements in
This was one of many cases in which
lower courts took one view and the higher courts another, or the same court
took different views in similar cases. The discrepancy arose because courts
used two different criteria in deciding such cases. Sometimes they asked if
the job requirements were plausible or
understandable; that is, if 'good reasons' could be given for them. On
other occasions they thought that such a criterion justified almost every
demand, and insisted that job requirements should be objectively necessary; that is, indispensable for discharging the
duties of the jobs concerned. It sounds plausible to say that since loose hairs
could cause infection or pose a risk to public health, surgeons or
those working in chocolate factories should not be allowed to sport beards.
However, the requirement turns out to be objectively unnecessary, for beards do
not mean loose hair and, if necessary, they can always be covered by a suitable clothing. After all, we do not ask people in
these jobs to shave hair off their heads and arms.
Although the test of objective
necessity is reasonable, it runs the risk of taking a purely instrumental view
of job requirements and stripping the organizations concerned of their cultural
identity. Take the case of nurses' uniforms. One could argue that since these
are not objectively necessary for carrying out the required medical tasks,
anyone may wear anything. This is to miss the crucial point that they symbolize
and reinforce the collective spirit of the nursing profession and structure
the expectations and behaviour of their patients. The
instrumental view of rationality implicit in the test of objective necessity is
also likely to provoke resentment against minorities whose cultural demands
might be seen to undermine a much-cherished tradition. It is also unjust
because, while it respects the cultural identity of the minority, it ignores
that of the wider society. The concept of objective necessity should therefore
be defined in a culturally sensitive manner and do justice to both the minority
and majority ways of life. This means that uniforms should be kept in
hospitals, schools and wherever else they are part of the tradition and
perform valuable symbolic, inspirational, aesthetic and other functions, but be
open to appropriate modifications when necessary. Such an arrangement neither deculturalizes the organizations concerned and renders them
bland, nor eclectically multiculturalizes them and
renders them comical, but preserves and adapts the tradition to changing
circumstances and facilitates minority integration into the suitably opened-up
mainstream society.
Equal treatment
In the cases discussed so far, it has
been relatively easy to identify what aspects were relevant and what equal
treatment consisted in. Situations sometimes arise when such judgements are not at all easy.
In most societies the law declares
that a marriage is void if contracted under duress, a concept not easy to
define in a culturally neutral manner. A British Asian girl, who had married
her parentally-chosen husband because of the threat of ostracism by her
family, asked the court to annul her marriage on grounds of duress. The court
declined, arguing that duress only occurred when there was a 'threat of
imminent danger to life and liberty'. This culturally insensitive
interpretation of duress was rightly criticized. Not surprisingly the court did
a complete volte face a few years later and declared
void the marriage of another Asian girl under similar circumstances. It took
the view that although acute social pressure did not amount to duress for a
white British girl, it did so for her Asian counterpart.
The Asian girl is clearly treated
differently, raising the question whether the difference amounts to privileging
her. Prima facie it would seem that
she is offered an additional ground for dissolution of marriage, and is thus
being privileged. However, this is not the case. The law lays
down that absence of duress is the basis of a valid marriage. Since ostracism
by the family virtually amounts to social death and hence to duress in Asian
society but not in white British society, the differential treatment of the
Asian and white girls does not offend against the principle of equality. It
does not give the Asian girl an additional ground for divorce, only interprets
the existing one in a culturally sensitive manner.
The recognition of cultural
differences might sometimes entitle a person to do things others cannot do
without necessarily implying unequal rights. Many countries allow Sikhs to
carry a suitably covered kirpan (a small dagger) in public places on
the ground that it is a mandatory symbol of their religion. If other citizens
asked to do that, their request would he turned down. This raises the question
whether non-Sikhs can legitimately complain of discrimination or unequal treatment.
There is no discrimination because their religious requirements are just as respected
as those of the Sikhs. As for the complaint of inequality, there is prima facie inequality of rights in the
sense that the Sikhs can do things others cannot. However, the inequality
arises out of the different demands of the same basic right to religion and
does not confer a new right on the Sikhs. Some religions might require more of
their adherents than do others, and then the same right would encompass a
wider range of activities. Their adherents have the same right as the rest and
its scope too is the same, only its content is wider.
Contextualizing equality
Sometimes we know what is relevant in a given context, but find it difficult
to decide if two individuals are equal in relation to it. Take l’affaire du foulard, which first surfaced in
The vagueness of the ruling not only
failed to give the headmaster clear guidance but publicly revealed the ambiguities
of the official policy. Soon there were more incidents of hijab-wearing and
protests by Muslims, provoking counter protests by secular Frenchmen. The standoff
was finally resolved when one of the girls voluntarily, and the other two under
pressure from King Hassan of
The national debate on the hijab went to the heart of the French
conceptions of citizenship and national identity and divided the country. Some
advocated laicite ouverte,
which largely amounted to a search for a negotiated solution with the
Muslims. Some others, including Madame Mitterrand, saw no reason for banning
the hijab and advocated the right to
difference and the concomitant celebration of plurality. Yet others questioned
the rigid application of the principle of laicite and argued for the teaching of religion in schools, both
because of its cultural importance and because pupils would not be able to make
sense of contemporary global conflicts without some knowledge of it.
These views, however, were confined to
a minority. The dominant view was firmly committed to the practice of laicite and hostile to any kind of
compromise with the Muslim girls. It was eloquently stated in a letter
to Le Nouvel Observateur- of 2 November 1989. signed by several eminent intellectuals and urging the
government not to perpetrate the 'Munich of Republican Education'. As the 'only institution consecrated to the universal'. the school must he a 'place of emancipation' and resist
'communal. religious and economic pressures' with 'discipline'
and 'courage'. For the signatories to the letter, as for a
large body of Frenchmen.
The principal argument against allowing
Muslim girls to wear the hijab then,
was that it violated the principle of laicite;and
went against the secular and assimilationist function of state schools. If
Muslim spokesmen were to argue their case persuasively, they needed to counter
this view. While some tried to do so, most realized that it raised many large
and complex questions that did not admit of easy and conclusive answers, and
that such a debate would take years to settle and did not help them in the
short run. As it happened. French state schools did
not strictly adhere to the principle of laicite.
and allowed Catholic girls to wear the cross and
other insignia of religious identity and the Jews to wear the kipa. Muslims decided to articulate their
demand in the language of equality and argued that. since they were denied the
right enjoyed by the other religious groups, they were being treated unequally.
Defenders of the ban, including the
Minister of Education, rejected the Muslim charge of discrimination on the ground
that the hijab was not equivalent to
the cross, and that the two groups of girls were not equal in relevant respects. First. unlike the 'discreetly' worn cross. the
‘ostentatious' hijab was
intended to put pressure on other Muslim girls and entailed 'proselytization'.
Second. unlike the freely-worn cross, the hijab symbolized and reinforced women's
oppression. Third. unlike the
unself-consciously worn cross. the
hijab was an ideologically motivated
assertion of religious identity inspired by a wider fundamentalist movement
which the schools had a duty to combat.
Although there is a good deal of humbug, misplaced anxiety and false alarm in
these arguments, they are not totally devoid oi-substance.
Both the cross and the hijab are rcligious symbols and hence bases of equal claims. However, religious svmbols cannot be defined and compared
in the abstract, both because they rarely have exactly equivalent significance
and because they acquire different meanings in different contexts and
historical periods, and might sometimes even cease to be religious in nature.
We need to contextualize them and compare them not abstractly or 'in
themselves' but in terms of the character and significance they might have
acquired at a particular point in time. The question is not whether the hijab is the Islamic equivalent of the
Christian cross, but whether in contemporary
As for the first argument. the hijab is certainly visible but there is
no obvious reason why religious symbols should be invisible or be of the same
type. Besides, there is no evidence to support the view that the hijab was intended to proselytize among
non-Muslims or to put religious pressure on other Muslim girls beyond the
minimum inherent in the wearing of religious symbols. Conversely, the cross is
not necessarily discreet for Catholic girls do sometimes display, flaunt and
talk about it, it is clearly visible when they engage in sports, swimming and
such other activities, and it is visible even otherwise except that we do not
see it because of its familiarity. Once the hijab
is allowed, it too would become invisible.
The second argument which contrasts
the freely-worn cross with the coerced hijab
is no more persuasive. It assumes that parental pressure is necessarily
wrong, a strange and untenable view, and that choices by adolescent girls are
always to be preferred over parental preferences, which is no more tenable. Furthermore. we have no means of
knowing that wearing the cross was a free choice by Catholic girls and that
Muslim girls wore the hijab only
under parental or communal pressure. It is true that the latter had hitherto
avoided it. However, nothing follows from this for it is quite possible that
they now defined their identity differently or felt more confident about
expressing it. Indeed, the father of the two Creil
girls said that the decision to wear the hijab
was theirs and that he had been trying to convince them out of it. Since he
might be saying this under pressure or to avoid embarrassment, we might refer
to the remark of a young girl who was inspired by the three Criel
girls to start wearing the headscarf in 1994:
I feel completely liberated by the
veil. As soon as I
put it on. I felt as if I'd blossomed. The veil allows a woman no longer
to be a slave to her body. It is the belief that a woman can go far through
means other than using her body.
The third argument for the ban is
equally unconvincing, for wearing the hijab
need not be a form of ideological self-assertion any more than wearing the
cross is. As for the fears about the rise of fundamentalism, a term that was
never clearly defined, they were speculative and irrelevant to the argument.
Only three out of scores of Muslim girls had worn the hijab, and the father of two of them had not only no history of
religious activism but was positively embarrassed by the publicity. There was
not much evidence either that most of the French Muslim community was becoming
religiously militant. Some of them did show considerable sympathy for
traditional values but that was not against the law- represented a kind of cultural
conservatism shared by many a Frenchman, and hardly amounted to fundamentalist
militancy.
Allowing the cross and other Christian
symbols but not the hijab then
clearly amounted to treating Muslim girls unequally. Some French leaders
conceded this, but insisted that the inequality was justified in order to
liberate the girls from their traditional patriarchal system and to prepare
them for an autonomous life. There is something to this argument, as equality
is one value among many and needs to be balanced against others. However, it
is open to several objections. It assumes without evidence that the girls decision to wear the hijab was not autonomous. Furthermore. autonomy is difficult to define and impossible to measure or
demonstrate. and any attempt to violate equality in
its name opens the door to all manner of specious reasoning and arbitrary interference
with pupils' ways of life. What is more, if the school started aggressively
promoting autonomy, it would create a threatening and alienating environment in
which girls would not feel relaxed enough to pursue their education. Parents,
too, would lose confidence in it and deny it their support and cooperation.
The widely shared belief
that the hijab symbolizes and
reinforces female subordination ignores its complex cultural dialectic. Muslim Immigrants in
The issues
raised by the hijab are not confined
to
Opponents of Muslim schools therefore
argue that no inequality is involved in denying state funding to Muslim schools
while continuing to provide it to other religious schools. Equality requires
equal treatment of those who are equal in relevant respects. The relevant
respect here is the capacity to provide a balanced religious and secular education.
Since Muslim schools lack that capacity, they cannot be treated on a par with
other religious schools. The second argument has a different thrust. It does
not say anything about whether or not the two kinds of schools are equal in
relevant respects, but it asserts that the state has decided to change its
policy on funding religious schools. Since it cannot abrogate its past
commitments, it must continue to fund Christian and Jewish schools. Although
this involves treating Muslims unequally, such inequalities are inherent in
social life and cannot be avoided. Long-established groups often enjoy rights
based on past commitments and policies. When the policies are changed, they
retain rights that are no longer available to newcomers.
Opponents of state funding for Muslim
schools make the important theoretical point that equality should not be
understood in purely formal and abstract terms. Just because some religious
communities enjoy state-funded schools, it does not necessarily follow that denying them to Muslims amounts to
inequality, for they might not be able to fulfill the socially prescribed
objectives of education or the state might sincerely wish to discontinue such
schools. Rather than accuse their opponents of being anti-Muslim, racists, and
so forth on the basis of an abstract and untenable view of equality, we need to
ask if their arguments have any merit.
The first argument is suspect. To say
that Islam is currently going through a fundamentalist phase is a gross
exaggeration, true at best of some but not of all Muslim countries. More to the
point, it is not at all true of British Islam. Since the British government
allows privately funded Muslim schools, it evidently shares this view and is wrong
to raise the bogey of fundamentalism only when state funding is involved. There
is also a rise in Christian and Jewish fundamentalism, but the British
government has shown no interest in acquiring greater control over or issuing
suitable warnings to state-funded Christian and Jewish schools. It is, of
course, possible that Muslim schools could become nurseries of fundamentalism
and fail to achieve their objectives. However, there are ways of guarding
against this. The government has the right to inspect and regulate schools
including their curriculum, pedagogy and general ethos, and has enough power to
counter such forms of fundamentalism as might arise in Muslim schools. The
power is bound to be greater, and its exercise more acceptable, if the state
also funds them.
The second argument is no better. The
British state certainly has the right to change its policy on funding religious
schools. This involves not only denying state funding to new schools, but also
phasing out the existing ones over a mutually agreed period of time, something
which the British state shows not the slightest sign of doing. There is no evidence
either that it is putting pressure on them to become secular or even to reduce
the religious content of their curriculum. Since neither of the two arguments
advanced by the government is valid, the denial of state funding to Muslim
schools is unjustified.
In the light of our discussions of the
hijab controversy in France and the
state funding of Muslim schools in Britain, it should be clear that equal treatment
of cultural communities is logically different from that of individuals. Unlike
the latter, it is deeply embedded in and inseparable from the wider cultural
and political relations between the communities involved. Besides, cultural
communities often contain a wide variety of views on a subject and cannot be
homogenized and reified. The case for intercultural equality should not
therefore be made in such abstract and ahistorical
terms that it ignores genuine differences between and within the communities
involved or fails to address the deepest anxieties of the wider society. We
should take a contexualized view of equality,
identify what respects are relevant, and demand equal treatment of those shown
to be equal in these respects. If the
hijab really is different from the
cross (which it is not), then Muslim girls may legitimately be denied the right
to wear it without incurring the charge of discriminating against them. And if
Muslim schools do really run the risk that their critics fear (which they do
not), or if the British state does really wish to discontinue religious schools
(which it does not), then they may legitimately be denied state funding without
offending against the principle of equality.
Taking such a
contextualized and politically and historically sensitive view of equality, no
doubt, creates its own problems. We leave too much space for specious reasoning
and alarmist fears, and run the risk of not knowing how to compare differences,
how to separate relevant from irrelevant differences, how to determine and
assess the context, and so on. It is therefore tempting to take the more
dependable route of insisting on the general right to equality, and argue that
since Christians and Jews have a right to their schools, Muslims too must have
a right to state-funded schools. In the light of what I have said, the
temptation should be resisted. If we ask the law to take such a mechanical and
simplistic view of equality, then we cannot consistently ask it to take cultural
differences into account in the case of the Sikhs and the marriage of the Asian
girl discussed earlier. The question therefore is not whether Muslims have a
right to religious freedom but what, if anything, that right entails in a
specific context, and that involves deciding what features of the context are relevant and whether Muslims are
equal in respect to them. The
movement from a general right to equality to the right to a specific treatment
in a specific context, that is, from a general right to religion to the right
to wear the hijab in the school, is
not direct and deductive but contextually mediated.
The danger that such a contextualized
view of equality might encourage discrimination and disingenuous reasoning is
real. The French ban on the hijab and
the British government's denial of publicly funded Muslim schools were at least
in part motivated by anti-Muslim sentiments, and we need to guard against
this. We can do so in two ways. We should insist that equality requires
identical treatment and place the onus of justification on those seeking
to depart from it. Thus British Muslims should be assumed to be entitled to
state-funded schools, and it is up to the government to show to the
satisfaction of all concerned why such schools might legitimately be denied to
them. Secondly, it should be possible for the unconvinced minorities to appeal
against government decisions to such public bodies as the courts or the
Commission on Human Rights. The reason why the controversy dragged on for years
in
Limits of equality
It is sometimes difficult
to decide what constitutes equal treatment because several different forms of
treatment fit that description.
In the aftermath of
the Rushdie affair in 1989, leaders of non-Christian religions. especially
Islam, began to complain that the established church and the anti-blasphemy
law privileged Christianity and treated them unequally. Their complaint
received two different responses. Some, mainly conservatives, rejected it on
the ground that since Britain was a Christian society in the sense that Christianity meant much to most of its
members and was a source of many of their moral values, and also a Christian state in the sense that a historical settlement
between the state and the Church of England had made Christianity an integral
part of the former's corporate identity, Christianity rightly enjoyed a special
political status. It was woven into the very structure of British national
identity, and could not and should not be treated as just one religion amongst
many. Others, mainly but not only the liberals, conceded the Muslim charges of
discrimination, and mostly agreed that the principle of equality required
disestablishment of the Anglican church, but disagreed about the
anti-blasphemy law, some advocating its abolition and others its extension to
all religions.
Most Muslim spokesmen rejected the
conservative response. First, no historical settlement could claim permanence
as it was a product of its time and subject to revision in the light of new
circumstances, Second, such a positivist argument
justified existing privileges and denied justice to newcomers. Third, the
principle of equality, which
We are confronted with a wide variety
of views concerning what the principle of religious equality requires in
relation to both the established church and the anti-blasphemy law, and need
to decide which of them is more persuasive. Religious equality could be
understood in two senses. It could mean equal respect for religions taken as
collective wholes or for the religious beliefs and practices of individuals;
that is, it could mean equality of religions
or equal right to religion. The latter
is beyond dispute in a liberal and indeed any decent society. The former is not
so simple. Like all other societies
While all this is true, it is also the
case that
Any reasonable interpretation of
religious equality, understood as equality of religions, must take
account of both these facts. The only way to do so is both to accept the
privileged status of Christianity and give some public recognition to other
religions. Christianity may rightly remain the central component of British
collective identity, provided that other religions receive adequate, though
not necessarily equal, recognition and representation in the institutions,
rituals and ceremonies of the state. For example. representatives of other religions could be appointed to the
House of Lords along with Anglican bishops: state ceremonies such as the
coronation and Remembrance Day could be broadened to include a non-Christian
component: and the ruling monarch could patronize non-Christian festivals and
events. In so doing, British society both retains its historically acquired
religious identity and publicly acknowledges its current multireligious
composition.
As for the anti-blasphemy law, it is
only contingently related to the established church. In an earlier era the two
went together: in today's liberal climate they need not. There are four
possible ways of dealing with the law; namely, to keep it as it is, to abolish
it, to extend it to all religions, or to protect only the religion(s) under
threat. The antiblasphemy law relates to people's religious beliefs and
practices and seeks to protect them against scurrilous, abusive or offensive
attacks. Since the religious beliefs and practices of all citizens deserve
equal respect, the first alternative which privileges Christianity is discriminatory
and deserves to be rejected. The fact that Christianity is the religion of the
majority is relevant in other contexts but not in this one, for here we are
concerned with civil rights and not with the political expression of national
identity. Since every religion can claim to be under threat and there is no way
to adjudicate their claims in a collectively acceptable manner, the fourth
alternative too is ruled out. This leaves
us with the second and third interpretations. Since Christianity enjoys
cultural and political preeminence and minority religions are relatively
powerless, abolition of the anti-blasphemy law would have a disproportionately
adverse effect on them. Unless there are other reasons for abolishing the law,
the third interpretation that it should be extended to all religions has most
to be said in favour of it so far as the principle of equality is concerned. Equality,
however, is not the only value. We also need to take into account the
importance of free speech, the claims of secular citizens, the
difficulties of defining religion and blasphemy, the merits and demerits of the
state's endorsement of religion, and so on. When we do that, we might perhaps
conclude that the law deserves to be abolished.
Implications
In the light of our discussion of the
problems involved in applying the principle of equality in a multicultural
society, several important conclusions follow. When we take legitimate
cultural differences into account, as we should, equal treatment is likely to
involve different or differential treatment, raising the question as to how we
can ensure that the latter does not amount to discrimination or privilege.
There is no easy answer to this. As a general rule it would seem that different
treatments of individuals or groups are equal if they represent different ways
of realizing the same right. opportunity or in whatever other respect they are
intended to be treated equally, and if as a result none of the parties involved
is better-off or worse-off. The Sikh who is allowed to carry a kirpan and a
Christian who is not are treated differently but equally because they are both
exercising the same right in different ways and because the former does not
secure an advantage over or at the expense of the latter. And an Asian girl
whose marriage is declared void when contracted under threat of parental
ostracism, and a white girl whose marriage under similar circumstances is not. are both treated equally though differently because they are
subject to the same general rule that duress voids a marriage. In
all such cases we need to consider the nature and the purpose of the right or
the rule involved, and show that the differential treatment is justified in terms of it.
Disagreements are bound to arise at both levels, especially the former. Since
there is no way to resolve them conclusively, cross-cultural application of
equality will always remain vulnerable to the opposite charges of privileging
or discriminating against a particular group.
In a multicultural society one might
sometimes need to go further and grant not only different but also additional
rights to some groups or individuals. This may be necessary either to equalize
them with the rest or to achieve such worthwhile collective goals as political
integration, social harmony and encouragement of cultural diversity. If some
groups have long been marginalized or suppressed, lack the confidence and the
opportunity to participate as equals in mainstream society, or are subjected to
vigorous assimilation, we might need to give them rights not available to
others, such as special or disproportionate representation in parliament, the
cabinet and other government bodies and the right to consultation and even
perhaps a veto over laws relating to them. The purpose of such additional
rights is to draw the groups involved into the mainstream of society and give
substance to the principle of equal citizenship.
There may also be groups in society
who have been traumatized by their recent history, or feel culturally insecure,
or are under particular threat. We may then need to give them rights not
available to the majority in order to reassure them, promote social harmony,
give them a stake in the country's political stability and foster a common
sense of belonging. Born in the trauma of the partition of the country and the
enormous intercommunal violence that accompanied it,
the Constitution of India wisely decided to grant its minorities several
additional rights. In
Liberals, who insist that all citizens
should enjoy equal rights, feel troubled by such additional rights to
minorities, and either disapprove of them or justify them on the ground that
they are intended to equalize these groups with the rest of their
fellow-citizens. Their first response represents the triumph of dogma over
prudence and is sometimes a recipe for disharmony and disorder in a
multicultural society. Their second response makes moral and political sense
but misrepresents the basis of the rights. While some additional rights
of minorities are meant to equalize them with the rest, others are designed to
promote such worthwhile collective goals as social harmony, cultural diversity
and a common sense of belonging. Like equality, they too are important values
and we need to balance their competing demands.
Although society has a duty to treat
all its citizens equally, its ability to do so is necessarily limited. It has a
dominant language, and no language is culturally neutral. While it should
cherish its minority languages and help their speakers acquire competence in
the dominant language, it cannot always give these an equal public status.
Every society also has a historically inherited cultural structure which
informs its conduct of public life. While it has a duty to modify it to
accommodate the legitimate demands of its minorities, it cannot do so beyond a
certain point without losing its coherence and causing widespread
disorientation, anxiety and even resistance. This is likely to lead to unequal
treatment of its cultural minorities in certain areas, about which in spite of
all its good intentions it might be able to do little. In all western societies
Sunday is a day of rest for obvious cultural and religious reasons. This puts
Muslims at a disadvantage who, unlike Christians,
cannot join communal prayer on Friday, their holy day. Although provisions
should be made to accommodate Muslim employees and reduce the inequality, it is
difficult to see how it can be eliminated altogether without unscrambling the
prevailing cultural structure and incurring an enormous social and financial
cost. Such inescapable inequalities occur in even more acute forms in other
areas of life as well. Which inequalities are eliminable, at what cost, and who
should bear it are bound to be a matter of dispute. Since often there is no one
just or rational way to resolve the disputes, they are best settled by
discussion, negotiation and compromise.