Study Questions for Plato, Euthyphro

 

Numbers like ‘32a’ refer to the numbers in the margins of the text. These refer to pages of the standard Greek text (and the letters to parts of those pages), and can be used with any translation.

  1. The dialogues in this book (with the exception of the Meno) tell the story of Socrates’ trial, imprisonment and death.  This first one takes place just before his trial, when he has been indicted for ‘corrupting the youth’ of Athens.  Socrates says (3a-b) that he wants to learn from Euthyphro what piety is, so that he will be better able to defend himself in court – but is he kidding?
  2. Euthyphro tells (2c-e) about the ‘crime’ his father has committed and explains why he is honor-bound to bring charges against him.  Should we admire Euthyphro’s willingness to act on principle even when this brings him to prosecute his own father?  Or is he (as Socrates seems to think) violating a duty of loyalty to his father (and thus acting ‘impiously’)? 
  3. Socrates asks Euthyphro to teach him “what is the pious” – or, as we might say, ‘what piety is’.  Not too many people nowadays are interested in being pious.  But I think that the arguments Socrates will bring forward in connection with ‘the pious’ would apply just as much to any other value term: ‘the good’, ‘the right’, ‘the just’, and so on.  So I think we have good reason to pay attention to this dialogue, even if we do not aspire to piety.
  4. At 5e Euthyphro offers his first attempt to explain what piety is.  Notice that Socrates expresses (6a-b) some mild skepticism about the sort of story Euthyphro tells about the gods (what we would now call a myth).  But that is not his main objection to Euthyphro’s definition; that comes at 6e.  What is it?  Why does he reject Euthyphro’s definition?
  5. Euthyphro tries again at 7a.  What is his second definition? 
  6. Socrates says that this definition is the right kind of answer – but he still rejects it, arguing over the course of the next couple of pages that it will not do.  Why not?
  7. Euthyphro makes a third attempt at 9e, defining the pious as “what all the gods love.”  Socrates responds with a question (at 10a) which strikes many modern readers as the heart of this dialogue: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?”  Translating this thought into a more contemporary form we might ask, “Does God approve of an action because it is right, or is it right because God approves of it?”  Socrates spends the next couple of pages explaining to Euthyphro that the first alternative is correct and not the second – concluding first at 10d-e and then again at 11a-b.  The reasoning is rather convoluted, but the point is clear enough:  It may be true that the gods love pious acts, but that is not what makes them pious (or holy or right or just).  Rather they are loved (and lovable) because they are pious (or holy or right or just). 
  8. Euthyphro accuses Socrates (11b) of making his statements ‘go around’.  Socrates refers to the mythic craftsman/inventor Daedalus, who was supposed to be so skilled that he could make statues that came to life and moved.  Notice that Socrates claims (11e) to be disappointed that he cannot get Euthyphro’s definitions to ‘stand still’.
  9. Socrates reframes the question for Euthyphro and at 12e Euthyphro tries again.  What is his 4th definition?
  10. Socrates undermines this last definition, arguing that the gods have no need of human service or care, so Euthyphro’s definition really reduces to the one he gave before (15b)
  11. Characteristically, Socrates is still saying that “we must investigate again from the beginning what piety is,” (15d) while Euthyuphro has run out of patience and hurries away.