Study Questions for Plato, Euthyphro
Numbers like ‘32a’ refer to the numbers in the margins of
the text. These refer to pages of the standard Greek text (and the letters to
parts of those pages), and can be used with any translation.
- The dialogues in this book
(with the exception of the Meno) tell the story of Socrates’ trial, imprisonment
and death. This first one takes
place just before his trial, when he has been indicted for ‘corrupting the
youth’ of Athens. Socrates says (3a-b) that he wants to
learn from Euthyphro what piety is, so that he
will be better able to defend himself in court – but is he kidding?
- Euthyphro
tells (2c-e) about the ‘crime’ his father has committed and explains why
he is honor-bound to bring charges against him. Should we admire Euthyphro’s
willingness to act on principle even when this brings him to prosecute his
own father? Or is he (as Socrates
seems to think) violating a duty of loyalty to his father (and thus acting
‘impiously’)?
- Socrates asks Euthyphro to teach him “what is the pious” – or, as we
might say, ‘what piety is’. Not too
many people nowadays are interested in being pious. But I think that the arguments Socrates
will bring forward in connection with ‘the pious’ would apply just as much
to any other value term: ‘the good’, ‘the right’, ‘the just’, and so
on. So I think we have good reason
to pay attention to this dialogue, even if we do not aspire to piety.
- At 5e Euthyphro
offers his first attempt to explain what piety is. Notice that Socrates expresses (6a-b)
some mild skepticism about the sort of story Euthyphro
tells about the gods (what we would now call a myth). But that is not his main objection to Euthyphro’s definition; that comes at 6e. What is it? Why does he reject Euthyphro’s
definition?
- Euthyphro
tries again at 7a. What is his
second definition?
- Socrates says that this
definition is the right kind of
answer – but he still rejects it, arguing over the course of the next
couple of pages that it will not do.
Why not?
- Euthyphro
makes a third attempt at 9e, defining the pious as “what all the gods
love.” Socrates responds with a
question (at 10a) which strikes many modern readers as the heart of this
dialogue: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it
pious because it is loved by the gods?”
Translating this thought into a more contemporary form we might
ask, “Does God approve of an action because it is right, or is it right
because God approves of it?”
Socrates spends the next couple of pages explaining to Euthyphro that the first alternative is correct and
not the second – concluding first at 10d-e and then again at 11a-b. The reasoning is rather convoluted, but
the point is clear enough: It may
be true that the gods love pious acts, but that is not what makes them pious (or holy or right
or just). Rather they are loved
(and lovable) because they are
pious (or holy or right or just).
- Euthyphro
accuses Socrates (11b) of making his statements ‘go around’. Socrates refers to the mythic
craftsman/inventor Daedalus, who was supposed to
be so skilled that he could make statues that came to life and moved. Notice that Socrates claims (11e) to be disappointed
that he cannot get Euthyphro’s definitions to
‘stand still’.
- Socrates reframes the
question for Euthyphro and at 12e Euthyphro tries again.
What is his 4th definition?
- Socrates undermines this last
definition, arguing that the gods have no need of human service or care,
so Euthyphro’s definition really reduces to the
one he gave before (15b)
- Characteristically, Socrates
is still saying that “we must investigate again from the beginning what
piety is,” (15d) while Euthyuphro has run out of
patience and hurries away.