General Philosophy -- Study
Questions for Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, pp.3-49
A note about reading
Nietzsche: Nietzsche can be infuriating.
He says insulting things about Christians, Jews, women, philosophers,
the Germans, the English, and other groups.
Sometimes his insults seem to have a point; other times they seem
gratuitous. At the same time his
writing style can also be maddening. He
writes mainly in short sections, not always clearly or obviously related to one
another (or even consistent with one another).
Pretty clearly he is sometimes joking and sometimes exaggerating and
sometimes putting forward ideas he will elsewhere criticize and reject. It is
not easy to figure out what he is really trying to convey to us. Try to read him with an open mind, not to be
too put off by his insults, and to see if you can’t find some sense in what he
says.
1. Note the explanation of the book’s title given on
p.3-4: the hammer is not a sledgehammer smashing idols; it is more like a
piano-tuner’s hammer, tapping the idols to see whether or not they are hollow.
2. (Pp.12-17)
What is Nietzsche trying to say about Socrates? Why does he bring up Socrates' appearance? His social class? His last words (as reported by Plato)?
3. On p.14 Nietzsche says "Dialectic . . . is not
very convincing." Judging from the
samples we've encountered, do you agree with this assessment? What is Nietzsche’s explanation (in section
8) for the attraction of dialectic?
4. Do you agree that Socrates (and Plato) "made a
tyrant out of reason?" What do you
think of Nietzsche’s explanation of their motives for doing so? (p.16)
5. What exactly is "the error which lay in his
belief in 'rationality at all costs'?" (Section 11, p.16-17)
6. In the next two sections (pp.18-24) Nietzsche
criticizes philosophers who distrust the senses and talk about a 'true world'
behind or beyond illusory appearances.
Do you think this applies to any of the philosophers we have read? What do you think of Nietzsche's critique?
7. In section 5 (pp.20-21) Nietzsche develops the idea
that it is not our senses that are a source of illusion; it is our
language. It is our language which
teaches us to believe in an “I” and in “the will.” (I think one way our
language is supposed to mislead us is that it encourages us to think that there
is a substance or a thing corresponding to every word which is the subject of a
sentence.) You might consider whether Descartes made this kind of mistake in
connection with his famous “Cogito”: I
think. Therefore, I am. Therefore, I am
a thing which thinks.
8. What do you think Nietzsche means when he says
(p.24), "Along with the true world we have also done away with the
apparent!”?
9. Some general questions for the chapter,
“Morality as Anti-Nature”: What does
Nietzsche mean by calling morality "anti-nature"? What kind of morality is he talking
about? Is his characterization of
Christian morality fair? (In section 4 he seems to admit that there can be a
"healthy morality." How does
this fit in?) What sort of
"nature” is he talking about?
10. In section 1 of “Morality as Anti-Nature”
(pp.25-26) Nietzsche seems to be making use of a distinction between, on the
one hand, trying to eradicate or eliminate passions and, on the other hand,
“spiritualizing” passions. He says that
“the Church fights passion by cutting it out; its practice, its ‘therapy’ is castration.” Is this a fair characterization of the
Christian tradition? What do you
suppose he means by “spiritualize, beautify, deify a desire”?
11. Section 2: Why is it weak people
who try to eradicate their desires (or who preach asceticism)?
12. Section 3: “the value of having enemies”
– what might one need enemies for?
13. Section 4 begins “—I put a principle into
a formula.” Perhaps this should alert
us to the possibility that what follows is a bit oversimplified. Nietzsche distinguishes ‘healthy
morality’ from ‘anti-natural morality’, saying that the former serves
life’s instincts and the latter condemns them.
What would you put on a list of ‘instincts of life’? Is it fair to say that traditional or
conventional morality condemns those instincts?
14. Section 5 develops (briefly!) a crucial
idea: that values are the products of (and thus can be interpreted as symptoms
of) various kinds of life. (We will read more about this later.) What sort of life produces Christian (“anti-natural”)
morality?
15. Why does Nietzsche think that it is
ridiculous to tell people what they should be? (Pp.28-29)
16. Why does Nietzsche say that conventional
morality is "a specific error for
which one should have no sympathy"?
(P.29)
17. “The Four Great Errors”: The first 'great
error' is confusing cause and effect.
How is conventional thinking about morality supposed to confuse cause
and effect? (Pp.30-31)
18. Try to read section 3 (p.31-2) as a
critique of Descartes' concept of mind.
19. The third great error is the “error of
imaginary causes.” What are the causes
Nietzsche thinks are imaginary? Why
does he think people make up causes for things? How is it that “The entire realm of morality and religion belongs
under this concept of imaginary causes”?
20. Fourth “the error of free will”: What motive does Nietzsche find behind the
doctrine of free will? (pp.35-36) Do you think it is possible to 'get rid of'
the concepts of guilt and responsibility?
What would it be like to live that way?
Does it seem like a good idea?
21. “Those Who ‘Improve’ Humanity”: In section 1 we again meet the idea that we
can interpret a morality (a specific sort of value system) as a symptom. Also the bold statement “there are no moral
facts at all.” Many people nowadays are
inclined to agree with this sort of statement and to think that we need to make
a sharp distinction between facts and values.
Are you, though, willing to say that every value judgment is
“just an interpretation”?
22. "All the means by which humanity was
to have been made moral up to now were immoral
from the bottom up." (p.42) How so?
What are the two methods of “improving humanity” that Nietzsche
identifies? (Pp,38-41) How does each
involve immorality?
23. “What the Germans Are Missing” is not as
important for our purposes, but there are some interesting remarks on higher
education on pp.46-49.