Some Kantian terminology:
"A priori" -- a Latin
term (literally, "from what is before") which refers to the kind of
knowledge that does not depend on experience but only on reasoning. A priori knowledge can be discovered without
doing experiments or carrying out observations. For example, we can prove that the sum of the angles of a
triangle is always 180 degrees by reasoning; we do not have to carefully
measure thousands of triangles. Much
mathematical knowledge is clearly of this kind. Kant also thought that certain basic propositions about the
physical world (like "Every event has a cause") and the fundamental
principles of morality could be known a priori.
The opposite term is "a
posteriori (literally, "from what
comes after"). A posteriori
knowledge does depend on experience, observation, etc. We know that water under standard conditions
boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit only because experiments were carried out and
measurements were made.
"Analytic" -- an
analytic judgment is one in which the predicate is 'contained in' the
subject. "All bachelors are
unmarried" is analytic because "unmarried" is part of the
definition of "bachelor."
Analytic judgments are thus, in a sense, uninformative. They don't tell us anything about the world
but only about way we use certain terms.
The opposite term is
"synthetic." A synthetic judgment
joins (at least) two different concepts.
"Bachelors tend to be tidy" is a synthetic judgment because
"tidy" is not part of the definition of "bachelor."
“Empirical” - based on sensory
experience
Study
Questions:
1. At the beginning of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (p.23) Kant claims that nothing is “good without qualification” except a “good will.” He then discusses a variety of “talents of the mind” and “qualities of temperament,” arguing that none of them is good in itself (without a good will). Do you think he’s right?
2. In the next section (pp.23-24), Kant insists that a good will is good ‘in itself’ and not because of the results it produces. He seems to think that what is admirable is trying to do the right thing, regardless of whether you succeed. What do you think about this?
3. In the next section (pp.24-25), Kant tries to support his idea (that the good will is not good because of its results) by thinking about “the purpose of nature.” That is, he looks at what sort of natural purpose our will seems to be good for. He shifts quickly to talking not about will but about reason. This is because he is thinking of these as very closely connected: our will is a rational will. It is a will that can be opposed to our passions or emotions. (For Kant, will is what enables us to resist temptation. For example, in the face of danger I may feel afraid, but reason tells me it is my duty to stay and face the danger, and I exercise my will to overcome my fear. More on this below.) Now Kant says something you may find surprising. He says that this capacity to reason (and to do what reason tells us to do) is not useful for our preservation or our happiness. As far as these natural purposes go, we would have been better off if we were creatures of instinct. If all nature had wanted to do was to equip us to pursue happiness, she should have given us infallible instincts. Instead she gave us a rational will. Since this rational will isn’t much good for pursuing happiness, it must have “another and much more worthy purpose. . . . it’s true function must be to produce a will which is good, not as a means to some further end, but in itself.” In other words, contrary to what you might have thought (and contrary to utilitarianism), happiness is not the purpose of life, and being good may require us to sacrifice our happiness.
4.
What does Kant mean by a ‘good will’, anyway? We begin to find out in the section that
begins at the bottom of page 25 and in the following several sections (to page
29). It has to do with ‘duty’. On pp.26-28 he develops a distinction
between acting in conformity with duty and acting from the motive of duty. To have a good will it is not enough to do
the right thing. We have to do it because
it is the right thing. His examples
try to bring out the fact that we often have a variety of motives for our
actions and that it is only in fairly unusual circumstances that we can be sure
that we are acting ‘from duty’ and not ‘from inclination’. Try to get clear about what each of his
examples is supposed to illustrate.