Some Kantian terminology:
"A priori" -- a Latin
term (literally, "from what is before") which refers to the kind of
knowledge that does not depend on experience but only on reasoning. A priori knowledge can be discovered without
doing experiments or carrying out observations. For example, we can prove that the sum of the angles of a
triangle is always 180 degrees by reasoning; we do not have to carefully
measure thousands of triangles. Much
mathematical knowledge is clearly of this kind. Kant also thought that certain basic propositions about the
physical world (like "Every event has a cause") and the fundamental
principles of morality could be known a priori.
The opposite term is "a
posteriori (literally, "from what
comes after"). A posteriori
knowledge does depend on experience, observation, etc. We know that water under standard conditions
boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit only because experiments were carried out and
measurements were made.
"Analytic" -- an
analytic judgment is one in which the predicate is 'contained in' the
subject. "All bachelors are
unmarried" is analytic because "unmarried" is part of the
definition of "bachelor."
Analytic judgments are thus, in a sense, uninformative. They don't tell us anything about the world
but only about way we use certain terms.
The opposite term is
"synthetic." A synthetic judgment
joins (at least) two different concepts.
"Bachelors tend to be tidy" is a synthetic judgment because
"tidy" is not part of the definition of "bachelor."
“Empirical” - based on sensory
experience
Study
Questions:
1. At the beginning of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (p.23) Kant claims that nothing is “good without qualification” except a “good will.” He then discusses a variety of “talents of the mind” and “qualities of temperament,” arguing that none of them is good in itself (without a good will). Do you think he’s right?
2. In the next section (pp.23-24), Kant insists that a good will is good ‘in itself’ and not because of the results it produces. He seems to think that what is admirable is trying to do the right thing, regardless of whether you succeed. What do you think about this?
3. In the next section (pp.24-25), Kant tries to support his idea (that the good will is not good because of its results) by thinking about “the purpose of nature.” That is, he looks at what sort of natural purpose our will seems to be good for. He shifts quickly to talking not about will but about reason. This is because he is thinking of these as very closely connected: our will is a rational will. It is a will that can be opposed to our passions or emotions. (For Kant, will is what enables us to resist temptation. For example, in the face of danger I may feel afraid, but reason tells me it is my duty to stay and face the danger, and I exercise my will to overcome my fear. More on this below.) Now Kant says something you may find surprising. He says that this capacity to reason (and to do what reason tells us to do) is not useful for our preservation or our happiness. As far as these natural purposes go, we would have been better off if we were creatures of instinct. If all nature had wanted to do was to equip us to pursue happiness, she should have given us infallible instincts. Instead she gave us a rational will. Since this rational will isn’t much good for pursuing happiness, it must have “another and much more worthy purpose. . . . it’s true function must be to produce a will which is good, not as a means to some further end, but in itself.” In other words, contrary to what you might have thought (and contrary to utilitarianism), happiness is not the purpose of life, and being good may require us to sacrifice our happiness.
4.
What does Kant mean by a ‘good will’, anyway? We begin to find out in the section that
begins at the bottom of page 25 and in the following several sections (to page
29). It has to do with ‘duty’. On pp.26-28 he develops a distinction
between acting in conformity with duty and acting from the motive of duty. To have a good will it is not enough to do
the right thing. We have to do it because
it is the right thing. His examples
try to bring out the fact that we often have a variety of motives for our
actions and that it is only in fairly unusual circumstances that we can be sure
that we are acting ‘from duty’ and not ‘from inclination’. Try to get clear about what each of his
examples is supposed to illustrate.
5. On page 29 he begins to explain his famous “Categorical Imperative.” If you read this section carefully, I think you will see that the basic idea is the one expressed by the familiar question, “What if everyone did that?”
6. Try to sort out: the distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives, and the division of hypothetical imperatives into problematic and assertoric. Some notes:
a. A hypothetical imperative tells you that if you want to attain a certain goal, then you must act in a certain way. (If you want to get into medical school, then you must study hard. If you want people to trust you, then you ought to tell the truth. Even: If you want to get into heaven, then you must obey God’s laws. ) These imperatives only apply to a person who wants to attain that goal. That is, they only apply to me on the hypothesis that I want to attain the goal. If I don’t want to attain that goal, then the imperative has no force for me.
i. A problematic hypothetical imperative says that an action is good for some purpose that you may or may not have. (You may or may not want to get into medical school.) Whether you want to attain that goal is problematic.
ii. An assertoric hypothetical imperative says that an action is good for some purpose that you necessarily do have. Happiness is such a goal. Kant thinks that whatever else we want (or don’t want) we certainly want to be happy. So we may confidently assert that you ought to do what is necessary to attain happiness. We need not worry that you will reject this goal. But the imperative is still conditional. Its form is still “If you want to be happy, then you should _______.” (Fill in the blank with some action.)
b. A categorical imperative contains no ‘if’s. It simply tells you to do something (or not to do something). (Don’t steal. Honor your parents. Never lie.) Kant thinks that we will agree that moral rules have this form. They apply to everyone. You can’t evade a moral rule by saying, “Well, I don’t happen to want ______.” (Fill in the blank with some goal.)
c. Kant is trying to explain how it is possible for there to be a valid categorical imperative. It’s not hard to understand how reason can tell me what to do if I want to reach a certain goal. But how can reason tell me that I ought to act in a certain way, no matter what I want? How can there be an imperative that applies to me regardless of my goals or purposes? What could such an imperative say? And why should I regard it as binding on me?
d. “apodeictic” (p.31) means “self-evident”
7. (P.31) Since we are looking for an imperative that applies to anyone, regardless of his or her desires and purposes, we cannot appeal to those desires and purposes. All we have to work with is “the mere concept of a categorical imperative” – that is, a command that every rational creature is obliged to obey. Since we cannot appeal to any particular content (desire, purpose, goal), we are left with the form – that is, with the fact that this command we are looking for has the form of a law for all rational beings (Kant says “the universality of a law as such”). So the only possible categorical imperative must be an imperative that tells us to follow the rules that are fit to be universal laws (laws for everyone). Think about it.
8. In
essence, then, the Categorical Imperative is a test for the rightness or
wrongness of actions. If I am thinking
about acting in a certain way, I should ask myself whether I can reasonably
want everyone to act in that way. More
precisely, I should ask myself, “What rule would I be following, if I did what
I am thinking about doing.” My rule
would include not only what I am proposing to do but also some
description of the circumstances in which I am tempted to do it. The rule, then, would look something like
this: “When I am in such-and-such circumstances, I will do such-and-such.” For example, it might be, “When I want
something very badly, and I can’t afford to buy it, and I think I can steal it
without getting caught, then I will steal it.”
Or it might be, “When I want something very badly, and I can’t afford to
buy it, I will work and save my money until I can afford to buy it.” Then I should ask myself whether I can
reasonably want (Kant says “will”) everyone to follow this rule. If the answer is ‘yes’, then what I am
thinking of doing is morally permissible.
If the answer is ‘no’, then what I am thinking about doing is wrong.
(Which of the two rules I just gave as examples would pass this test? Why?) Try to understand the reasoning that
Kant uses to show, in each of his four examples (pp. 32-33), that what the
person is proposing to do is contrary to the categorical imperative (i.e.,
cannot be made into a universal law).
(Examples 2 and 4 are easier to understand. Don’t worry if #s 1 and 3 seem obscure.)
9. (Pp. 33-35) Kant now introduces another important
(and famous) idea. He claims that the categorical imperative can be expressed
in a different way: as a principle requiring us to respect persons (to treat them as ‘ends in themselves’ and
not just as means to your ends). He
thinks that this new idea is (in some sense) equivalent to the earlier
ones. This is not easy to see.
a. Try to get clear on Kant's distinction between an objective end and a subjective (or contingent) end. ("End" here means, roughly, "goal," "purpose," or "reason for acting.")
b. Note his claim that only an objective end can give us a moral law. I think the idea is roughly this: Because it is a categorical imperative, the moral law commands us to act in certain ways regardless of what we want or how we feel. This makes sense only if there are some creatures in the world whose value we must respect regardless of what we want or how we feel about them. Such creatures are those we call persons. Persons must be respected even when they are thwarting our plans and even when we don’t like them. (It is important to keep in mind, though, that the respect Kant is talking about here is not the sort of respect we feel for people who are especially accomplished or noble. It might be called ‘minimal respect’ – the sort of respect a person deserves just because he or she is a person. One can respect a person, in this sense, even while punishing them for committing a crime.) If there were no such creatures, if everything in the world had only instrumental value (like a tool), then there would be nothing wrong with doing whatever you wanted. We wouldn’t need morality; there would be no moral law.
c. Note also how he discusses the same four examples (seen above on pp.30-32) from this new angle (pp.35-36). Do some of them make more sense when considered in this new way than they did when they were discussed in terms of ‘universal law’?
Note Kant’s criticism of the “Golden Rule” as a fundamental moral principle in footnote #5 on page 37. (The Latin phrase means roughly "What you don't want done to you, don't do to another.") Why do you think he says that the Golden Rule would allow a criminal “to dispute with the judges who punish him”?